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COMPARATIVE  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW AND
INTERPRETIVE METAPHORS
Vicki C. Jackson*
Debate  over  the  appropriate  role  of foreign  and  international  law  in
adjudication of public law claims is not unique to the United States.'  Some
of the opposition in the United States is driven by resistance  to the Supreme
Court's  decision  on  the  merits  of  the  issues  in  recent  "hot  button"
constitutional  cases.  But  the  fierceness  of positions  being  taken  in the
United  States,  the  xenophobic  hostility  unveiled  in  some  discussions  of
foreign  law,  and  the  emergence  of  legislative  efforts  to  control  the
interpretive  sources the Court looks at, suggest that there is something more
than ordinary constitutional  disagreement  at stake.2  At least three different
sets of concerns  are  layered on each other in this debate about foreign and
international  law (which I refer to jointly as "transnational  legal sources").
One question entailed in current discussions of foreign  law  is about what
the United  States and U.S. law stand for in a world perceived as hostile and
threatening.  External  threats  to  the  security  of a nation  that  had become
* Professor of Law, Georgetown  University Law Center.  With thanks  for helpful comments
to Mark Tushnet, Susan Low Bloch,  Robert  Taylor, David Schneiderman,  Marty Lederman,
Dan Tarullo,  Sasha  Volokh,  Alex  Aleinikoff, Jim  Feinerman,  Peter Bryne,  Judith  Resnik,
Rosalind Dixon, and David Fontana,  as well as Richard  Fallon and other faculty and  student
participants  in the Harvard  Public Law Workshop,  where a longer version of this paper was
presented  in April  2006.  I want to  thank Jim Fleming  for  organizing and  my  co-panelists
(Noah Feldman, Martin  Flaherty, Catherine Powell, and Alec Stone Sweet) for a stimulating
conversation  at  the  Fordham  Symposium.  I also  thank  my  research  assistants,  Andrew
Eberle  and  Joseph  Gallagher,  for  their  able  help  with  the  footnotes.  The  "living  tree"
metaphor  is  found in Edwards v. Attorney-General  for Canada, [1930] A.C.  124,  136 (P.C.
1929) (appeal taken from Can.).
1.  For example, in Canada, although there is  little controversy over whether in principle
it  is  legitimate  to  consider  foreign  constitutional  decisions  in  interpreting  the  Canadian
Charter, there  is disagreement  on  the persuasive  value of U.S.  First Amendment  case  law.
See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990]  3 S.C.R.  697, 740-44  (Can.) (Dickson, C.J.) (distinguishing
U.S. case law); id. at 812-19  (McLachlin, J.,  dissenting) (discussing and relying on U.S. case
law).
2.  For  a  fierce  critique  of the  U.S.  Supreme  Court's  use  of foreign  law  in  Roper v.
Simmons,  541  U.S.  551  (2005),  see  Richard  A. Posner, Foreword: A  Political Court, 119
Harv. L. Rev.  31,  84-90 (2005).  For a description of a death threat against two  Justices for
their having referred to or supported the use of foreign or international law in  constitutional
cases,  see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect  to the Opinions  of [Human]kind":  The
Value  of a  Comparative  Perspective  in  Constitutional  Adjudication,  Speech  Before  the
Constitutional  Court  of  South  Africa  (Feb.  7,  2006),  available  at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-02-07b-06.html.FORDHAM  LA W RE VIEW
used to seeing  itself, and its  values,  as invincible,  seem to be  layered over
the  "culture  wars"  about  "social  values,"  traditional  ideas  under  assault
from within and  without.  In this debate, references  to foreign  law  may be
cast as a form of judicial disloyalty to a distinctively American  ethos.3  As I
have  argued  elsewhere,  however,  American  exceptionalism  has
comparative  underpinnings  that  might  welcome  rather  than  reject
thoughtful  engagement  with  the  laws  of other  democratic,  constitutional
systems.
4
A  second  question  is  whether,  in  referring  to  foreign  law  or  legal
experience,  the Court  is "expanding  the  canon"  or  introducing  something
novel to  constitutional  interpretation.5  Historic  challenges  are  unfounded.
The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  has  a  longstanding  practice  of  (at  least
episodically)  considering  foreign  legal  experience  in  resolving  American
constitutional  questions.  Scholarship in the  last several  years convincingly
shows  that  reference  to  foreign  law  and  practice,  or  to  the  usages  of
"civilized nations,"  is no novelty but has roots as old as the Court's earliest
constitutional  decisions,6  and  by  no  means  limited  to  explaining  the
3.  See,  e.g.,  American  Justice  for  American  Citizens  Act,  H.R.  1658,  109th  Cong.
(2005)  (asserting  that judicial  references  to foreign  law in Atkins  v.  Virginia, 536 U.S.  304
(2002)  and  Lawrence v.  Texas,  539  U.S.  558  (2003)  were  undermining  American  self-
governance  under its own  written constitution and stating that no federal  court, including  the
Supreme  Court, "shall, in the purported exercise of the judicial power to interpret and apply
the  Constitution  of the  United  States,  employ  the  constitution,  laws,  administrative  rules,
executive  orders,  directives,  policies,  or judicial decisions of any international  organization
or foreign  state,  except for  the English  constitutional  and common  law or other sources  of
law relied  on by the Framers of the  [U.S.] Constitution"); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48
(Scalia,  J.,  dissenting) (objecting to the majority's brief reference  to the views of the "'world
community,'  whose notions of  justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people").
4.  See  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons:  The
Youngstown  Decision  and American  Exceptionalism,  30  Harv.  J.L.  &  Pub.  Pol'y
(forthcoming  2006)  (arguing,  inter  alia,  that  rational  exceptionalism  is  implicitly
comparative  and can  be  a source of resistance  to the darker impulses of the day by referring
constitutional  adjudicators  to the practices  of other countries  to help better understand and
realize our own commitments to liberty, equality, fairness, and the rule of law).
5.  See, e.g., Charles  Fried, Scholars and Judges:  Reason and Power, 23  Harv.  J.L.  &
Pub. Pol'y 807, 819 (2000).
6.  See, e.g., Marbury  v. Madison,  5 U.S. (1 Cranch)  137,  163,  176-78 (1803);  Chisholm
v.  Georgia,  2  U.S.  (2  Dall.)  419,  459-60  (1793)  (Wilson,  J.);  see also  Steven  Calabresi,
Lawrence,  The  Fourteenth Amendment,  and the Supreme  Court's Reliance on  Foreign
Constitutional  Law:  An  Originalist Reappraisal,  65  Ohio  St.  L.J.  1097,  1104-05  (2004);
Steven G.  Calabresi  & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl,  The Supreme Court and Foreign  Sources
of Law:  Two Hundred Years of Practice  and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47  Wm.
& Mary L.  Rev.  743 (2005);  Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International  Constitution, 31  Yale J.
Int'l  L.  1 (2006);  David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional  Law, 49  UCLA
L.  Rev.  539,  545-49,  552-56  (2001);  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119  Harv.  L.  Rev.  109,  109  & nn.3-4,  110  &  n.7,
111,  114  (2005)  [hereinafter  Jackson,  Constitutional Comparisons]; Vicki  C.  Jackson,
Transnational  Discourse, Relational Authority and the U.S. Court:  Gender Equality, 37
Loy.  L.A.  L.  Rev.  271,  335-37  &  nn.227-28  (2003)  [hereinafter  Jackson,  Transnational
Discourse].
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Founding  generation's  specific  understandings. 7   While  many  of  the
references  are  brief, others  are more  substantial.  Justice  Robert  Jackson's
concurrence  in  Youngstown v. Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is an example of
a thoughtful discussion of foreign constitutional experience towards  gaining
further  perspective  on  difficult questions  of U.S.  constitutional  law.8  His
two-page  discussion  of European  constitutional  approaches  to  emergency
powers in the period up to and including World War II  is omitted from most
of  the  leading  casebooks, 9  illustrating  the  power  of  legal  education  to
construct  incomplete  understandings of our own past interpretive practices.
Few  U.S.  cases  make  as  fully  argued  a  use  of  foreign  constitutional
experience  as Justice  Jackson's  concurrence  did, although  Justice  Stephen
Breyer's discussion of foreign federalisms in Printz v.  United States was on
the  Jackson  model. 10  But  a  considerable  number  of the  Court's  cases
include  opinions  in  which  foreign  law  or practice  is  noted,  sometimes  in
support, sometimes as a point of contrast.
What  is new  in recent years is not so much the  occasional  discussion  of
foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court, but the growth  in the availability  of
constitutional  or  human  rights  decisions  in  the  world  and  the  increased
transnational  discourse  among  courts  described  by  Anne-Marie  Slaughter
7.  For  discussion  of  contemporary  or  post-Founding  foreign  materials,  see,  for
example,  Washington  v.  Glucksberg, 521  U.S.  702,  710  n.8,  718  n.16,  734  (1997);
Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube  Co.  v.  Sawyer,  343  U.S.  579,  651-52  (1952)  (Jackson,  J.,
concurring);  Wickard v.  Filburn, 317  U.S.  111,  125-26 & n.27  (1942);  Muller v.  Oregon,
208  U.S.  412,  419-20  n.1  (1908);  Jacobson v.  Massachusetts, 197  U.S.  11,  31-33  & n.1
(1905);  see  also,  for  example,  United States v.  County of Allegheny,  322  U.S.  174,  198
(1944)  (Frankfurter, J.,  dissenting);  Graves v. New  York  ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491
(1939)  (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
8.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650-52 (1952)  (Jackson, J.,
concurring).  Justice  Jackson  argued  that  President  Harry  S.  Truman's  claim  of inherent
authority  was  essentially  one  for  recognition  of  emergency  powers  on  the  part  of the
President.  The  possibility  of emergencies  had  not escaped  notice  of the  original  framers,
but,  he  argued,  they  had  addressed  it  only  through  the  provision  authorizing  legislative
suspension of habeas corpus.  On this point, he said,  it was not entirely "irrelevant"  to notice
recent  experience  in  Europe  with  constitutions  and  emergencies.  Id. at  651.  In  Weimar
Germany,  he  said,  the  constitution  permitted  the  executive  to  declare  an  emergency  and
suspend  civil  liberties, a power used more  than  250 times  in thirteen years, until  it was last
used when Hitler came to power.  In France,  by contrast, the  legislature was required  to act
to declare  a "state  of siege," and define  the legal consequences  thereof. Id.  In the U.K.,  the
Parliament  essentially  authorized  emergency  rule  by  the  cabinet,  retaining  the  power  to
terminate  it.  Jackson  wrote  that  the  constitutional  experiences  of  these  nations  were
"inconclusive"  on  whether  a  modem  constitution  ought  to  provide  for  the  exercise  of
emergency powers.  Id. at  652.  "But,"  he concluded,  "it  suggests that emergency powers are
consistent  with  free  government  only  when  their  control  is  lodged  elsewhere  than  in  the
Executive who exercises them."  Id.
9.  See Jackson,  supra note  4  (manuscript  at  text  accompanying  notes  27-30,  on  file
with the Fordham Law Review).
10.  See Printz  v.  United  States,  521  U.S.  898,  976-77  (1997)  (Breyer,  J.,  dissenting)
(noting that "the  United States is  not the only nation that  seeks to reconcile  the practical need
for a  central authority  with  the  democratic virtues  of more  local  control,"  and  that "other
countries [including  Switzerland  and Germany],  facing  the same basic problem,  have found
that  local  control  is better  maintained  through  application  of a  principle  that  is the  direct
opposite of  the principle the majority derives  from the silence of our Constitution").
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and others.'1   There are today a broader and  deeper set of international and
foreign  legal  sources  arguably  relevant  to  U.S. constitutional  adjudication,
sources  whose richness  and diversity suggest the need  for more disciplined
knowledge  and usage of transnational  law. 1 2  The relevance  and legitimacy
of  considering  transnational  law  will  vary  depending  on  the  issue  of
domestic  law  and the nature of the  foreign  or international  source. 13  And
there are  considerable  challenges  to  correct  understanding  and appropriate
comparisons with foreign law.' 4  But we can begin to identify questions  to
ask-for example,  how ubiquitous or diverse  are constitutional  approaches
to  an  issue? 15   Is  the  question  embedded  in  a  historically  contingent
compromise  viewed  as  essential  to  a  nation's  existence  or  is  it  instead
viewed  as  a  commitment  to  rights  understood  as  having  universal
features? 16   Is  the  source  international  law  or  foreign  domestic
11.  See, e.g., Anne-Marie  Slaughter, A  Typology of Transjudicial  Communication, 29 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 99 (1994).
12.  Cf Practice  Direction  (Citation  of Authorities),  (2001)  1 W.L.R.  1001,  1 (Eng.)
(issued  by  Lord  Chief Justice  of England and  Wales),  available at http://www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/cms/814.htm  (explaining that because  of the "growth in the number of readily
available  reports  of judgments  in  this  and  other  jurisdictions...  the  current  weight  of
available  material  causes  problems  both  for  advocates  and  for  courts"  and  promulgating
rules limiting and regulating citation of authority both  from within Britain and from  foreign
jurisdictions).  With  respect  to  foreign  law,  "[c]ases  decided  in  other jurisdictions  can,  if
properly used, be a valuable source  of law  in this jurisdiction...  [but]  should not be cited
without proper consideration of whether it does indeed add to the existing body of law."  Id.
9.1;  see also id.  9.2  (requiring  advocates,  inter  alia,  to "indicate...  what  [the  foreign]
authority adds that is not to be found in authority in this jurisdiction;  or, if there  is said to be
justification  for  adding  to  domestic  authority,  what  that justification  is;  [and]  certify  that
there  is  no authority  in  this jurisdiction  that precludes  the  acceptance  by the  court  of the
proposition that the foreign authority is said to establish").
13.  See Jackson,  Constitutional Comparisons,  supra note  6, at  124-26  (arguing that the
legitimacy of comparison  will vary with the issue of domestic law;  that the persuasive  value
of foreign  law depends on its reasoning, the comparability of its context, and its  institutional
origin;  and  what  is  "fair"  use  of  foreign  sources  will  depend  on  the  purpose  of  the
comparison).
14.  Indeed,  some have suggested that foreign law and experience offer too vast a field to
master in order to avoid errors, and thus should not play any significant role in constitutional
adjudication.  As others note, the very diversity of foreign  law poses difficulties  in choosing
what to consider, as  well as the  challenge of properly understanding  the foreign  context for
whatever rule or practice  is under examination.  And, it might be  argued, the United  States,
with its older constitution and depth of precedent on many issues, may have less to gain from
considering transnational  law on many issues. Cf, e.g.,  Christopher McCrudden, A  Common
Law of Human Rights?:  Transnational  Judicial  Conversations on Constitutional  Rights, 20
Oxford  J.  Legal  Stud.  499,  514  (2000)  (noting that courts  might consider  foreign  law  to
avoid "reinvent[ing]  the wheel"  on issues  new to their systems but dealt with in others).  But
cf  Jackson,  Transnational Discourse, supra note  6,  at  339-41  (noting  concern  about
expertise  and arguing that comparative experience  may be  particularly helpful in addressing
how to integrate newer constitutional commitments  with older ones);  Jackson, Constitutional
Comparisons, supra note  6,  at  126  (noting  challenges);  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Narratives of
Federalism: Of Continuities  and Comparative Constitutional  Experience, 51  Duke L.J. 223,
343 (2001)  (discussing concerns for expertise).
15.  See Jackson,  Constitutional  Comparisons,  supra note 6, at  127.
16.  See  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Comparative Constitutional  Federalism and Transnational
Judicial Discourse, 2  Int'l  J.  Const.  L.  91,  102-08  (2004)  (explaining  why  comparative
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constitutional  law? 17  Thoughtful debate  has moved  on, as it should, to the
questions of when,  how, and for what purposes  foreign  or international  law
should  be  used  in  constitutional  interpretation.  And  this  third  debate  is
embedded  in  a  larger  discussion  of constitutional  interpretation  and  the
appropriate limits of judicial review.
One axis  of disagreement over constitutional  interpretation in the United
States  is between  proponents of originalism and proponents  of the "living
constitution," 18  catchwords  that  represent  simplified  poles  in  a  complex
spectrum  of views  about  democratic  legitimacy,  the rule  of law, judicial
constraint,  and judicial competence.  These  questions,  going to the role  of
courts  in constitutional  systems, are  considered  in  other countries  as well.
Part  I  below  explores  the  interpretive  approaches  of  three  other  high
national  courts  that  have  engaged  in  constitutional  review  over  a  long
period  of time,  identifying  two  respects  in which  they  may  bear  on  this
debate. 19  First,  their jurisprudence  relies  on  interpretive  approaches  that
depend  on  multiple  sources  and  forms  of argument-what  some  call  an
"eclectic"  method,20 and others might call common law constitutionalism. 21
Second, the jurisprudence of other significant  national courts  acknowledges
the  possibility  that  interpretive  understandings  will  change.  Indeed,  in
those  countries  with  continuity  of rights-protecting  constitutional  regimes
constitutional  law  may  be  less  relevant  in analyzing  constitutional  federalism  issues  than
constitutional rights questions); Jackson, supra  note  14, at 255-56, 268-74.
17.  See Jackson,  supra note 4  (manuscript  at  text  accompanying  notes  54-79,  on  file
with  the  Fordham  Law  Review).  International  law  may  be  a  necessary  source  for
understanding  certain constitutional  terms, like  "war,"  "treaty,"  or "offenses  against the law
of nations."  See,  e.g.,  Roger  P.  Alford,  Misusing International Sources to  Interpret the
Constitution, 98  Am.  J.  Int'l  L.  57,  58  n.10  (2004);  Cleveland,  supra note  6,  at  12-23;
Michael  D.  Ramsey, International  Materials and Domestic Rights:  Reflections on Atkins
and Lawrence,  98 Am. J. Int'l L. 69,  71  & n. 14 (2004).  In other cases,  foreign constitutional
law--depending  on what  country  or countries it  is from-may  have  significant persuasive
force, especially insofar as  it reflects  decisions of a domestic  court to  enforce norms against
its  own government  on  an  ongoing  basis.  See Jackson,  Constitutional  Comparisons, supra
note 6,  at  125; Jackson,  Transnational  Discourse,  supra note  6, at 343-45.  Other aspects of
a  transnational  legal  source  may  also  be  significant  in  evaluating  their  relevance  in
constitutional interpretation.  See,  e.g.,  Cleveland, supra note  6,  at  113-22  (suggesting  that
the universality of an international  legal principle, and the position of the United  States with
respect  to  it,  are  both  relevant  to  the  bearing  of  international  law  on  constitutional
interpretation).
18.  Compare, e.g.,  Antonin  Scalia,  Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57  U.  Cin. L. Rev.
849 (1989),  with, e.g.,  Morton J.  Horowitz, Foreword:  The Constitution of Change:  Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism,  107  Harv.  L. Rev. 32  (1993).
19.  I  will  hereafter  refer  to  these  courts  as  "constitutional  courts,"  whether  they  are
specialized  and  focus  primarily  on  constitutional  disputes,  as  in  Germany,  or  are  more
"generalist"  courts  hearing  statutory as well as  constitutional  cases,  as  in the  United States,
Canada, and Australia.
20.  Mark  Tushnet,  The  United States:  Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in
Interpreting Constitutions:  A Comparative  Study 7 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy  ed.,  2006).
21.  For  differing  perspectives  on  common  law  approaches  to  constitutional
interpretation,  see,  for  example,  David  A.  Strauss,  Common  Law  Constitutional
Interpretation,  63  U. Chi.  L.  Rev.  877 (1996);  Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:
Burkean Political  Theory and Constitutional  Interpretation,  72 N.C. L. Rev. 619 (1994).
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and  with  high  courts  vested  with  the  power  of judicial  review,22 it  is  a
hallmark that constitutions be construed in a certain  sense as "living,"  with
prior interpretations  open to modification  in light of new developments  and
changed understandings.  This may be a consequence  of the debilitation  of
rationales for intentionalism  beyond original generations,  and of changes in
legal  consciousness  that  undermine  the  plausibility  of  more  formalist
methods.  The ubiquity of interpretive change and of multi-sourced  methods
of interpretation raises questions about claims that democratic legitimacy  or
appropriate  levels  of judicial  restraint  depend  on  formalist,  intentionalist
modes of interpretation and exclusive reliance on constitutional  amendment
for change.
Part II explores the metaphors through which we think about the "living"
and "original"  Constitution.  The U.S. metaphor-a  "living  constitution"-
does  not  necessarily  capture  the  actual  methodologies  of  our  own
constitutional  interpretation,  which  remain  grounded  in  constitutional  text
and  whose sources  include  original understandings  as well  as later history
and precedent.  In  Canada, a widely  used metaphor is of their constitution
as  a  "living  tree."  The  idea  of a  "living  tree"  may  better  embrace  the
multiple  modalities-text,  original  intentions,  structure  and  purpose,
precedent  and  doctrine,  values  and  ethos,  prudential  or  consequentialist
concerns--of contemporary  constitutional  interpretation.  It  suggests  that
constitutional  interpretation  is  constrained  by  the  past,  but  not  entirely.
Unlike  the  less  tethered  "living  constitution,"  it  captures  the  idea  of
constraint,  the  role  of text  and  original  understanding  in  the  roots  of the
constitutional  tree  and the role  of precedent  and new  developments  in  its
growth.  Yet  all  metaphors  mislead;  they  can  obscure  as  much  as  they
illuminate;  and  the  tree  metaphor  understates  the  effects  of  major
constitutional  change  and  the  role  of  human  agency  in  that  process.
Nonetheless,  moving  the  metaphor  to  the  Constitution  as  a  "living  tree"
may emphasize  commonalities  in interpretive  approaches  and  thus support
the  idea  of  legitimate  constitutional  disagreement  as  an  ordinary  part  of
adjudication,  not  a  symptom  of  "lawless"  judges  engaged  in  "naked
political judgment. '23
22.  My  reliance  on  continuity  over time  as  a  measure  of those  relatively  successful
systems with which to draw  comparisons may involve some degree of tautology.  Indeed, it
is hard  to see  how  interpretation  could be  anything  other than  "living"  in a  system with  a
relatively  more  "rigid"  constitution,  like  that  of  the  United  States,  which  imposes
extraordinarily high barriers to constitutional amendments.  The three other countries whose
jurisprudence  I  discuss  in  this  paper  arguably  have  less  rigid,  formal  requirements  for
constitutional  amendments.  See,  e.g.,  infra note  47  (describing  Germany's  requirements).
While  this  paper  emphasizes  similarities  in  interpretation,  there  may  be  differences  in  the
degree to which major change  in interpretation has developed in the respective  courts' cases.
Although  one  could  hypothesize  that  such  differences  may  bear  some  relationship  to  the
degrees  of rigidity  in  amendment  formulae,  this  paper  does  not  examine  that  question
empirically.
23.  The last two sets of quoted words are from Posner, supra note 2, at 41,  75,  78, 90.
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I.  COMPARATIVE  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Professor  Mark  Tushnet  has  shown  how  awareness  of  comparative
experience  in  making  constitutions  undermines  the  assumptions  of
interpretive  approaches  that presume the coherence  of constitutional  text.24
I consider here whether comparative  experience  casts  light on claims about
"evolutive"  versus  "fixed  meaning"  approaches  to  constitutional
adjudication.  I suggest that comparative  experience shows that a number of
well-established  constitutional  courts tend to (1) write opinions that rely on
multiple  sources of legal argument and authority and (2)  shift doctrine over
time  in ways that may  evolve away from more  specific  understandings  of
initial constitution-makers.  I argue elsewhere in a more normative vein that
the  multiple  roles  of  written  constitutions  are,  over  time,  best
accommodated  through the interpretive  strategies characteristic  of common
law constitutionalism, 25 but my effort here is primarily positive.
Comparative  study suggests that  independent  constitutional  courts  have
tended to rely on a range of interpretive approaches  and arguments,  a range
that,  in its  diversity,  is comparable  to that  seen  in the United  States.  The
"eclectic"  practices of the U.S. Supreme Court are not out of line with those
used  in  Australia,  Canada,  and  Germany-other jurisdictions  with  well-
established  constitutional courts  (and  a history of judicial  independence) 26
24.  See Mark Tushnet,  The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional  Law, 108  Yale
L.J.  1225,  1285-1301  (1999)  (suggesting  that  comparative  study  of constitution-making
reveals considerable  "bricolage,"  which undermines claims  for coherence-based  theories  of
interpretation).
25.  See Vicki  C. Jackson, Defending Common Law Constitutionalism:  Constitutional
Justification in Comparative  Perspective (unpublished manuscript on file with  the Fordham
Law  Review)  (arguing,  inter  alia,  that  common  law  constitutional  interpretation  has  a
normatively  attractive capacity  to provide space for legitimate legal disagreement through its
multiple forms  and sources of argument).  I note  here only briefly that there may  also be
arguments  from  originalism for  such  approaches.  By providing  for judicial  review  under a
written  constitution,  constitution-makers  may  in  some  sense  be  understood  to  anticipate
these  phenomena-both  the  conventions  of  multi-sourced  legal  argumentation  and  the
possibility  of  evolution  in  constitutional  understandings.  See  also  Sotirios  A.  Barber,
Judicial  Review  and The Federalist,  55  U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  836,  862  (1988)  ("[In]  Publius's
thought,  adequacy  of  constitutional  communication  cannot  imply  the  elimination  of
controversy  and judgment  in  the  quest  for  the  Constitution's  practical  implications.");  cf
Peter J.  Smith,  The Marshall Court and the Originalist's  Dilemma, 90  Minn. L.  Rev.  612,
613-14,  623-30  (2006) (arguing  that  the  original  understanding  was  that later  practice  and
precedent  would  sometimes  be  needed  to  "fix"  the  meaning  of ambiguous  constitutional
provisions).
26.  By judicial  independence  in  this  context  I mean  that  the  courts  are  regarded  as
(relatively) uncorrupt and as having  sufficient autonomy  from other parts of the government
that they are on occasion willing to rule against the positions of their government.  I have not
attempted  a  comprehensive  survey  of constitutional  courts  meeting  these criteria  but have
relied  on  my  knowledge  of those  constitutional  courts  about  whom  a  fair  amount  of
scholarship has  been written  in English, which may  skew  analysis.  Although  the selection
criteria may not meet Professor Ran Hirschl's standards  for "theory  building through causal
inference," Ran  Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional  Law,
53  Am J.  Comp.  L.  125,  131  (2005),  studying  these arguably  similar courts'  work  can
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that  operate  in  a  context  in  which  other  branches  typically  comply  with
their decisions,  in  countries  with  respect  for political  and  civil  liberties. 27
deepen  understanding  of an  interpretive  debate.  In  an  effort  to  achieve  some  degree  of
comparability,  I have  also  limited this study to constitutional  courts that have been at work
for  at least  several  decades,  thus excluding  the newer constitutional courts  in, for  example,
South Africa or in Israel, where  the High Court's  role in constitutional review  has developed
ambiguously over recent decades.  See also note 27, infra, for discussion of country  selection
issues.
27.  Australia,  Canada, Germany, and  the United States  each receive  the highest ratings
for political  rights  and civil liberties  (1-1)  from Freedom  House, whose  tables are regarded
as representing  reasonably  reliable,  nonpartisan  evaluations.  See Freedom House,  Freedom
in  the  World:  Table  of  Independent  Countries  2005,  http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=211&year=2005  (last  visited  Oct.  16,  2006).  Each  of  these  four
countries has had a constitutional court  functioning for several  decades, with judges who are
regarded  as  independent  and whose  rulings  are generally  complied  with.  However,  I have
not  studied  the  constitutional  jurisprudence  of all  countries  with  1-1  ratings  that  have
constitutional  courts.  According  to  the  Freedom  House  report,  in  2005  there  were  46
independent  countries  with  1-1  ratings.  Not all  of these  ratings  are of long  standing,  and
many of the countries on this list are quite small (under one million people).  If one excludes
countries  that  had  only  recently  received  this  rating  (that  is,  in  either  the  2005  Freedom
House  Report  or  the  2004 -Freedom House  Report,  see Freedom  House,  Freedom  in  the
World:  Table  of  Independent  Countries  FIW  2004,  http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfi?page=229&year=2004  (last  visited  Oct.  16,  2006)),  and  if one  also  excludes
countries  with populations  of under one million persons,  there remain  twenty-one  countries
(including  the U.S.,  Canada, Germany,  and Australia).  Of these twenty-one  countries, some
have  not had courts empowered to engage  in binding constitutional  review of laws, as  is the
case  in  New  Zealand,  Netherlands,  and  the  U.K.,  and  some  have  courts  only  recently
authorized  to engage  in a very limited form of judicial review, as in Finland in 2000; judicial
review  in the  other Nordic countries  in this group  (Norway,  Sweden, and Denmark)  is also
notably restrained. See Jaakko  Husa,  Guarding the Constitutionality  of  Laws in the Nordic
Countries:  A  Comparative Perspective, 48  Am.  J.  Comp.  L.  345,  365  (2000);  see also
Stephen  Gardbaum,  The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism,  49 Am. J. Comp.
L.  707, 715  (2001).  Some other countries  have high courts  with  limited jurisdiction  over
judicial review of laws.  In Switzerland, for example,  the court does not have jurisdiction to
review  national  laws,  and in  France,  the  constitutionality  of statutes  can  be reviewed  only
before they go  into effect and  not at the  behest of a private citizen.  Other countries  in this
group  include  Austria,  Belgium,  Ireland,  Italy,  Poland,  Portugal,  Spain,  Slovenia,  and
Uruguay, though  in several  of these  countries the  high court's authority  to exercise judicial
review  is  far  newer  than  in  Germany.  My  conclusions,  it  should be  emphasized,  are  not
about whether constitutional courts are necessary  to protect civil liberties, nor are they about
all  constitutional  courts  in  civil-liberties  protecting  democracies,  but  they  concern  the
practices  of several  influential  constitutional courts,  whose  opinions  are read  beyond  their
own borders,  from  among  the  ten largest  countries  in this  group  of  1-1  nations.  The  ten
largest  population  states  in  the  long-standing  1-1  group  are  the  United  States,  Germany,
United  Kingdom,  France,  Italy,  Spain,  Canada,  Australia,  Netherlands,  and  Portugal.  See
United States Central Intelligence Agency, Rank Order: Population,  in The World Factbook
(2006), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html.
Of  these,  the  U.K.  still  adheres  at  least  formally  to  parliamentary  supremacy
(notwithstanding  the Human Rights Act (1998));  France and the Netherlands  were discussed
above;  and  Portugal  and  Spain adopted  new constitutions,  representing  a  sharp break  with
the past,  in the  1970s.  While  Italy's  constitutional  court  is almost as  old  as Germany's,  I
have  not found many of its decisions of recent  decades translated  into English.  For an early
study,  see  Samuel  A. Alito,  An  Introduction  to  the  Italian  Constitutional  Court (May  31,
1972)  (unpublished  undergraduate  Woodrow  Wilson  School  Scholar  Project  prepared  for
Professor Walter F. Murphy)  (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University), available  at
http://www.princeton.edu/-mudd/news/Alito-thesis.pdf.
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These courts  tend not  to  adopt  a  single  metric  for constitutional  analysis;
decisions discuss text, original understanding,  structure and purpose, history
and constitutional values,  and past decisions.  Comparative  experience thus
draws  attention  to  those  accounts  of  the  practice  and  legitimacy  of
constitutional interpretation  in the United States that emphasize the multiple
modalities  of  legitimate  constitutional  argument,  the  absence  of  clear
algorithms  for  resolving  disputes  between  those  lines  of arguments,  the
need for judicial judgment, and the tolerance for or receptivity to change in
constitutional understandings over time.28
To be  sure, there are  important  differences  in  what arguments  have  the
most  weight  in  the  decisions  of different  constitutional  courts.  The  U.S.
Supreme Court, for example,  relies more heavily on its own past precedents
and  history  than some  other  constitutional  courts.  Prior precedents  figure
importantly  in  Canadian  and  Australian  cases  as  well,  reflecting  their
common  law background.  German  decisions are more  likely to begin with
a statement of the fundamental  constitutional principle  at stake.  In each of
these  jurisdictions,  the  courts  employ  a  set  of arguments  and  analytical
techniques  that  go  beyond  the  text  and  typically  involve  resort  to  prior
decisions (even in systems not formally built on judicial precedent),  as  well
as  constitutional  purpose,  and,  on  occasion,  the  likely  consequences  of
alternative  interpretations  or  the  experience  of  other  democracies,  in
reasoning  that  will  not  be  unfamiliar  to  readers  of U.S.  Supreme  Court
decisions.
29
To illustrate  this point, consider the first German Abortion Decision (of
1975)  where the Federal  Constitutional Court  of Germany reached a result
strikingly different  from that in the  United  States, in an opinion that relies
on a number of sources and forms of argument.30  The Court concluded that
the government had an affirmative  duty to protect fetal life, even as against
the interests  of the  pregnant woman,  and that  a statute permitting abortion
in the first twelve weeks  (if the pregnant  woman  first had counseling  from
her  physician)  was  unconstitutional  as  inconsistent  with  this  affirmative
28.  See,  e.g.,  Philip  Bobbitt,  Constitutional  Fate  (1982);  Richard  H.  Fallon,  Jr.,  A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1189
(1987);  Strauss,  supra note  21.  For a discussion  of the  inevitable  interpretive  choices,  in
considering  "original  understandings,"  between  specific  and  abstract  levels  of  intent,
meaning,  or purpose,  see Erwin Chemerinsky,  The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 91-94 (1989).
29.  Case  law  from  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights-interpreting  a  quasi-
constitutional  human  rights  convention  to  which  signatory  nations are bound-is  likewise
multi-sourced,  though  perhaps  more  inclined  to  place  weight  on  the  text  of the  treaty
provision  at issue. See, e.g.,  Soering v. United  Kingdom,  App.  No.  14038/33,  11  Eur.  H.R.
Rep.  439,  87-89  (1989)  (referring  to  its  "spirit  and  intendment,"  the  need  to  make  its
protections  "practical  and  effective,"  changes  in  the  international  aspects  of crime,  and
noting other international  conventions,  in  interpreting article  3 of the  European Convention
on Human Rights).
30.  See  West German Abortion Decision:  A Contrast to Roe  v. Wade,  9 J.  Marshall J.
Prac. & Proc.  605 (1976)  (Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby trans.).
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governmental duty.31  The Court relied on the text of the Basic Law, which
declares "human dignity" to be "inviolable" and provides that "every person
shall  have  the  right  to  life,"32  but  is  silent  on  when  "life"  begins  and
contains  other  rights-guarantees  that might have  laid the  basis for  finding
equality  or  autonomy  rights  to protect  women's  decisions  to abort.33  To
supplement  its  understanding  of  the  text,  the  Court  referred  to  the
legislative  history of the  right-to-life  clause,  which  had  been  drafted  less
than thirty years earlier.  But the Court did not rely only on text and original
understandings.  Referring  to  its  own  past  decisions  ("constant  judicial
utterances")  and  its value-oriented  approach  to interpreting  the Basic  Law
(involving  an  "objective  ordering  of values"),34  the  Court  also  concluded
that  where  the  mother's  own  right  to  life  and  "sphere  of intimacy"  is  at
stake,  requiring  continuation  of the  pregnancy  was  not  constitutionally
"exactable"  from the  mother where  it would  pose a danger to her life  or a
grave  danger  to  her  health.  Accordingly,  it  held,  the  legislature  must
provide exceptions from the ban on abortions at least in those situations and
could provide  exceptions  for reasons  of comparable  gravity,  i.e.,  that  the
pregnancy  resulted  from  a  crime  or  that  the  fetus  suffered  from
nonremediable and serious medical problems. 35
In  rejecting  arguments  that  decriminalizing  counseled  first-trimester
abortions would  save more unborn  lives, 36 the Court held that it was  only
31.  The  Court found that the  statute failed sufficiently  to express legal  condemnation  of
the  interruption  of pregnancy.  Id. at  651.  A  vigorous  dissent,  agreeing  that there  was  a
constitutional  duty to protect human life before birth, disagreed that the Basic Law should be
interpreted to impose a duty to criminalize abortion. Id. at 663-64.
32.  Grundgesetz  [GG] [Basic  Law]  art. 2(2) (F.R.G.), translated  in Press & Info. Office
(F.R.G.),  Basic Law for the Federal Republic  of Germany (Christian Tomuschat & David P.
Curry  trans.,  1998)  (All  references  to  the  German  Basic  Law  in  English  are  from  this
translation.).  In Germany, the constitution is called  the Basic Law.
33.  See id. art. 2(1)  (protecting  "the  right to  free development  of [one's] personality"),
which the German Court agreed protected "the  sphere of intimacy" of the pregnant  woman,
but  was  of a  lesser  order of magnitude  than  the right  to  life.  See  West  German Abortion
Decision:  A  Contrast to Roe  v. Wade,  supra note  30, at  642; see also Grundgesetz  [GG]
[Basic  Law]  art.  3 (F.R.G.)  (establishing rights of equality,  specifically  including  between
men and women).
34.  West German Abortion Decision: A  Contrast  to Roe  v. Wade, supra  note  30, at 642.
The  idea  of the  "objective  ordering  of values"  may  be  compared  to  Professor  Strauss's
"preferred"  constitutional  provisions,  see  Strauss,  supra note  21,  at 882-83,  although  the
German objective order is a more ambitious concept, part of an effort to provide the basis for
a coherent  interpretation  of the  constitution  as  a  whole.  For  a  discussion,  see  Donald  P.
Kommers,  Germany:  Balancing Rights  and Duties,  in  Interpreting  Constitutions:  A
Comparative Study, supra note 20, at 161,  178-80.
35.  West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast  to Roe v. Wade, supra note 30, at 618-
19.  Under this reasoning,  the Texas  state law at issue in Roe v.  Wade, 410 U.S.  113 (1973),
would be  unconstitutional  because  it did  not allow abortions  in the  event of threats  to  the
mother's health, but only made exceptions to the criminal ban for those abortions  performed
"'for  the  purpose  of saving"'  the  mother's  life.  Id.  at  117-18  &  n.1  (quoting  the  Texas
statute).
36.  The German  statute  made abortions  in the first twelve  weeks after  conception  "not
punishable,"  provided there  was  counseling  on  the availability  of assistance  to go  forward
with the pregnancy. Id.  at 611-12.  This provision was found unconstitutional.
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permissible  to  except  from  legal  condemnation  those  specific  individual
cases for which there was adequate justification  for an abortion, but the first
trimester  counseling  model  of  the  law  gave  "unrestricted  power  of
disposition"  to  terminate  the  pregnancy,  regardless  of  reason,  to  the
pregnant woman. 37  The Court also reasoned, consequentially  and based on
comparative  experience, that permitting the abortion to be performed by the
same  physician  who  provided  counseling  (about  social  assistance  to
encourage  continuation  of  the  pregnancy)  would  be  ineffective  in
preventing  abortions;  as  experience  in England  showed,  doctors  could  be
found who would perform  counseling, not with an eye to  discouraging, but
with an eye to allowing abortion, either for reasons of financial self-interest
or  ideological  commitments  to  women's  emancipation  or  self-
determination. 38  The  Court rejected  arguments  from the  liberalization  of
abortion  laws in other Western countries because abortion regulations were
sharply  contested  everywhere  and  because  the  Basic  Law's  principles
could "be understood  only in light of the historical  experience and  spiritual
moral confrontation with the previous system of National Socialism." 39
In  this  one  opinion,  then,  we  see  high  theory,  historicism,  and
intentionalism,  and the balancing of different constitutional  interests within
an  interpretive  framework created  by the  German Court that  gives priority
to one over another of the constitutionally  protected  rights.  We also  see  a
concern  for the practical  consequences  of the  legislation  being evaluated,
drawing  on comparative  experience,  and at the same time an  insistence on
German  "exceptionalism"  in  interpreting  its  constitution,  framed  in  the
wake of the defeat and repudiation of Nazism.
Over  time,  continuities  and  change  in  the  Court's  approach  to  the
abortion  question  emerged.  In  the  1975  German Abortion Decision, the
Court  had  rejected  the  argument  that  "developing  life  would  be  better
protected  through  individual  counseling  of  the  pregnant  woman  than
through  a threat  of punishment,"  asserting that  "[t]he  weighing  in bulk  of
life  against  life which  leads to...  the  destruction  of a supposedly  smaller
number in the interests of the preservation of an  allegedly larger number is
not  reconcilable  with  the  obligation  of an  individual  protection  of each
single concrete  life."'40  In the Second German Abortion Decision of 1993,
the Court appeared  to retreat  from this position, based on experience  with
the  1975 law.41  As Professor Gerald Neuman  describes the  later decision,
with some  exceptions the  Court upheld  the  approach  of the new abortion
law (adopted following unification of East and West Germany)  insofar as it
eliminated  criminal  punishment  for  first-trimester  abortions  that  follow
37.  Id. at 652-53.
38.  Id. at 659.
39.  Id. at 662.
40.  Id. at 650, 655.
41.  For  related  discussion,  see  Richard  E.  Levy  &  Alexander  Somek,  Paradoxical
Parallels  in the American and German Abortion Decisions,  9  Tul. J.  Int'l & Comp.  L. 109,
137-41  (2001).
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independent  counseling  by  someone  other  than  the  physician  performing
the  abortion.42  Because  pregnancy  could  not  be  perceived  in  the  first
trimester,  "[a]  system that elicited  the  cooperation  of the woman  therefore
had  a greater  chance  of success  in preventing  abortion  than  a  system  that
antagonized  her  and  prompted  evasion,"  and  the  "threat  of  criminal
punishment and the subjection of the woman to third party evaluation of her
need for an  abortion had  proved  antagonizing. '43  While  adhering  to  the
central  point made  in the  first Abortion Decision about  the  constitutional
duty  of the  state  to  protect  fetal  life,44  the  court  was  willing  in  light  of
experience  to  relax  its  approach,  not  requiring  third  party  evaluation  of
whether suitable "indications"  for abortion were present, in the expectation
that a counseling based system would save more  fetal lives.
According to Professor Donald Kommers, the foremost American scholar
of the  last  thirty years  writing  on German  constitutional  law,  the German
Court generally draws on sources  including unwritten principles, the written
constitutional  text, the practices of German constitutionalism, the history of
the  constitution, judicial  precedents  (though rejecting  the principle of stare
decisis  as  such),  academic  writings,  and  comparative  and  international
materials;  the intentions of the drafters are in his view clearly secondary.  In
contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Court sees its role as one of
harmonizing  the  sometimes  conflicting  rights  and  duties  set  forth  in  the
Basic Law,45 in an effort  to establish constitutional  coherence and unity  in
the context of the broader German community.46  Kommers's description of
the  German  approach  and that of the  United  States suggests differences  in
degree,  not  kind:  "Most  Germans  would  accept  the  'living  instrument'
conception  of the Basic  Law, but they would be  less inclined..,  to admit
42.  See  Gerald  L.  Neuman,  Casey  in the Mirror:  Abortion, Abuse and the  Right to
Protection  in the United States and Germany, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 273 (1995).
43.  See id. at 282 (emphasizing  that the Court's methodology  in this decision required an
"empirical  estimate of the future effects" of the legislation).
44.  Indeed,  the  Court  held  that  changes  were  required  to  make  the  1993  statute
constitutional,  including  eliminating  a  provision declaring  that  abortion  in the  first  twelve
weeks was "not unlawful"  and demanding  more rigorous requirements  for the counseling to
encourage the pregnancy. Id. at 283-85.
45.  Kommers, supra note 34, at 177-78.
46.  Kommers writes,
This  notion  of  the  constitution  as  a  substantive  unity  has  good  pedigree  in
Germany's tradition of...  conceptual jurisprudence.  ..  ,a  tradition that envisions
law  as  a  self-contained,  internally  coherent,  system  of rules  and  norms.  Yet
constitutional  law  transcends  the  boundaries  of positive  law.  Social  context,
political  morality,  and  cultural  norms  play  an  important  role  in  constitutional
interpretation.  An important  interpretive canon  postulates  the interdependence  of
the  constitutional  order  and  the  broader  community.  The  nature  of  the
community-ie, the  German people-defines  and refines the constitutional  order,
just as the latter defines and refines the existential reality of the community.
Id. at 178.
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to  leaving  major  change-transformative  change  if  you  will-to
interpretation."
47
Canada,  whose  "living  tree" jurisprudence  is  discussed  further  below,
considers  a  broad  range  of  legal  arguments  and  factors  in  making
constitutional  decisions  and  allows  for  the  evolution  of its  constitutional
law.  A dramatic  example is the Canadian  Court's movement from  1991  to
2001  on the question of whether it would violate  the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms  to permit the extradition of a person to the United States to face a
possible  death  sentence. 48  In Kindler v.  Canada, 49 the  Supreme  Court of
Canada  rejected  a  claim  that  section  7  of  the  Charter  (prohibiting
deprivations  of liberty  inconsistent with fundamental  principles  of justice)
prohibited the extradition  of the defendant, who had already been sentenced
to  death,  to the United States.  A decade  later, however,  the Court  held in
United States  v.  Burns50  that,  in  general,  extradition  to  face  the  death
penalty  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  principles  of justice.
The  Court  explained  its  change  of  position  in  light  of  intervening
developments,  including  international  initiatives,  change  in  other  state
practices,  and accelerating  concern in Canada over wrongful convictions in
Canada  and  the  United  States.  Although  "the  basic  tenets  of [Canada's]
legal  system..,  have not changed since  1991 when Kindler and [Reference
re Ng Extradition] were  decided, ...  their  application  in  particular  cases
(the  'balancing process')  must take note of factual  developments  in Canada
and  in  relevant  foreign  jurisdictions ....  [The]  balance  which  tilted  in
favour of extradition without assurances in Kindler and Ng now tilts against
the constitutionality  of such an outcome. 51
47.  Id. at 179  ("Taking the constitution seriously  in Germany implies  heavy reliance  on
the  formal  amendatory  process  when political  or  social  realities begin  to diverge  from  the
original  handiwork  of the  Basic  Law's  framers.").  The  German  Basic  Law  is  easier  to
amend  than  the  U.S.  Constitution.  Compare Grundgesetz  [GG]  [Basic  Law]  art.  79(2)
(F.R.G.)  (providing that the Basic Law may be  amended by  a two thirds vote of each  house
of the German  legislature), with U.S. Const. art. V  ("The  Congress,  whenever two  thirds of
both Houses  shall deem  it necessary,  shall  propose Amendments  to this  Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several  States, shall call a Convention
for  proposing  Amendments,  which,  in  either  Case,  shall  be  valid ...  as  Part  of  this
Constitution,  when ratified by  the Legislatures  of three  fourths of the several  States,  or by
Conventions  in three  fourths  thereof, as  the one  or the other Mode  of Ratification may be
proposed  by  the  Congress .. ").  The  German  constitution  makes  some  of its  provisions
unamendable. See  Grundgesetz  [GG]  [Basic  Law]  art.  79(3)  (F.R.G.)  (which  include,  inter
alia, human dignity and the democratic and federal character of the F.R.G.).
48.  The  last execution in Canada was in  1962; the death penalty was abolished by statute
in Canada  in  1976 for all nonmilitary offenses; and in  1998  the death penalty was abolished
entirely. See Amnesty  Int'l Can.,  The Death Penalty  in Canada:  Twenty Years of Abolition,
http://www.amnesty.ca/deathpenalty/canada.php  (last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
49.  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
50.  [2001]  1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.).
51.  Id. at 361.  For a recent study of the Canadian  court's use of foreign or international
law  in  Charter  cases,  see  Bijon  Roy, An  Empirical Survey of Foreign  Jurisprudence and
International Instruments in  Charter  Litigation, 62  U.  Toronto  Fac.  L.  Rev.  99  (2004)
(finding  uses  of foreign or international  law  in  34  out of 402  Charter cases  decided  from
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It  is  not  only  in  Charter  cases  that  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court  has
applied  progressive  and  multi-factored  analyses  of  the  scope  of
constitutional  provisions.  For  example,  in  Reference  re  Employment
Insurance  Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23,52 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld
federal  power  to  enact  a  law  providing  for  paid  maternity  and  parental
leave.53  The  Quebec  Court  of Appeals  had  found the  law  ultra vires the
federal power  over "unemployment  insurance,"  relying on the more narrow
legislative  history  of the  1940  amendment  to  the  1867  Constitution  Act
authorizing  federal  unemployment  insurance.  The  Supreme  Court  of
Canada,  however, concluded  that changes  in women's  participation  in  the
labor market  since  1940 justified a broader understanding  of the  scope  of
this constitutional  authority.54  Although  not uncontroversial  (especially  in
Charter  cases), the  Canadian  Court's "living  tree"  metaphor  appears to  be
an accepted part of the legal discourse. 55
Australia  is an  interesting  contrast to  Canada because  its judges, for the
most part, have not  explicitly embraced  the  "living  constitution"  approach
found in Canada and in some German  and U.S. opinions.  While a range of
interpretive  views  have  been  expressed  by  its  justices,  including  some
jurists who argue that the Australian Constitution should be interpreted as a
"living  force,"56 a number of the judges who over time have  sat seem to be
committed to what Professor Goldsworthy  calls "moderate  originalism,"  or
"legalism,"  in which  the words  of the constitution  are understood to mean
1998-2003  and  concluding that references  were appropriately  cautious  and  did not involve
"cherry-picking"  or judicial activism).
52.  [2005]  2 S.C.R. 669 (Can.).
53.  Emphasizing  that  "the  Court  takes  a  progressive  approach  to  ensure  that
Confederation can be adapted to new social realities"  in identifying heads of federal power,
and referring to the "'living  tree'  metaphor,"  the Court rejected Quebec's argument that  the
principal  purpose of the  law (its pith and  substance)  was to  assist families, a matter within
provincial  authority;  rather,  the "fundamental  objective  of the maternity  benefits  plan  is to
protect  the  workers'  incomes  from  the  time  when  they  lose  or  cease  to  hold  their
employment to the time when they return to the labour market." Id. at 677, 687.
54.  Id. at 702.  Thus, the Court wrote,
The  evolution of the role of women in the labour market and of the role  of fathers
in  child care  are two  social factors  that have had  an undeniable economic  impact
on  individuals  who  are  active  participants  in  the  labour  market.  A  generous
interpretation  of the  provisions  of the  Constitution  permits  social  change  to  be
taken  into  account.  The  provincial  legislatures  have  jurisdiction  over  social
programs,  but  Parliament  also  has  the  power  to  provide  income  replacement
benefits  to  parents  who  must  take  time  off work  to  give  birth  to  or  care  for
children.  The  provision  of income  replacement  benefits  during  maternity  leave
and parental  leave  does  not trench  on the provincial jurisdiction  over property and
civil rights  ....
Id.
55.  See Wil  Waluchow, Constitutions as Living Trees:  An Idiot Defends, 18  Can.  J. L.
& Juris. 207 (2005).
56.  See Michael  Kirby,  Constitutional  Interpretation  and Original  Intent:  A  Form of
Ancestor Worship?, 24 Melb.  U. L. Rev.  1, 11  (2000) (approving  of Andrew Inglis Clark's
argument that the  Australian Constitution  must be  "made  a  living  force"  and  arguing  that
present understandings of the Constitution's meaning  should control interpretation today).
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the same thing now as when they were enacted.57  However, this originalist
approach  distinguishes  between  the  connotation  of the  term,  which  is
unchanging,  and  its  denotation,  or  application,  which  may  vary  as
circumstances  change.58  And the Australian  case law, while giving greater
weight to text  as  originally understood,  also pays  attention to many  of the
factors  discussed  by  other  courts,  including  "structural  principles  and
implications,"  which may  be unwritten,  and "policy"  concerns  of "justice,
utility and good government.
'59
Although  still  prone  to  formalism  or  "legalism,"60  in  recent  years  the
Australian Court has  shown some willingness to re-understand the meaning
of  constitutional  text  and  its  own  precedent  in  light  of  contemporary
development,  particularly under the years of the so-called "Mason  Court." '61
For example,  in Street v. Queensland  Bar Ass 'n,62 the Court reconsidered  a
question  decided  ten  years  earlier-whether  the  Constitution  permitted  a
state to impose  either a residency or a primary practice requirement  for an
attorney licensed  in another  state to become a member of the bar.  At issue
was the meaning of section  117  of the  1900  Constitution,  which had been
interpreted in a formal and narrow way, to  allow substantial  room for state
discrimination  against  out-of-staters. 63   The  Court-unanimously,  but  in
57.  See  Jeffrey  Goldsworthy,  Australia:  Devotion  to  Legalism,  in  Interpreting
Constitutions:  A Comparative  Study  106, supra note  20 [hereinafter Goldsworthy,  Devotion
to Legalism]; Jeffrey Goldsworthy,  Originalism in Constitutional  Interpretation,  25  Fed. L.
Rev.  1,  7  (1997)  [hereinafter  Goldsworthy,  Originalism].  The  approach  may  reflect
Australia's greater commitment to parliamentary sovereignty, also reflected in the absence of
a bill of rights  in its constitution.  The  Australian Constitution has only  a small  number  of
provisions  concerning  individual  rights  at  the  federal  level.  In  1988,  a  proposed
constitutional amendment  to extend  those rights to the  states  was overwhelmingly  rejected.
Goldsworthy,  Devotion to Legalism, supra, at  110;  see also James  Allan, Paying  for the
Comfort of  Dogma, 25 Sydney L. Rev.  63, 65,  66 n. 11  (2003).
58.  See  Goldsworthy, Originalism, supra note 57,  at 31-32;  see also id. at 20  (arguing
that a distinction  in "enactment"  and "application"  intentions, which roughly corresponds to
the  distinction  between broad  concepts  and specific  conceptions,  is  an aspect  of moderate
originalism, under which only enactment intentions  are relevant  to constitutional  meaning);
see also Street v. Queensland  Bar Ass'n  (1989)  168  C.L.R. 461,  537-38  (Austl.)  (Dawson,
J.) (discussing "denotation"  and "connotation"  of constitutional terms).
59.  Goldsworthy, Devotion to Legalism, supra note 57, at 128,  131-33.
60.  Id.  at  132-34.  For  a helpful  comment,  see  also Leslie  Zines,  The  Present State of
Constitutional  Interpretation, in The High Court  at the Crossroads:  Essays in Constitutional
Law 224,  234-38 (Adrienne Stone & George Williams eds., 2000) (describing  the decision in
Lange v.  Australian Broadcasting Corp. as  having  more  the  tone  than the  substance  of a
more  legalistic  attitude,  critically  discussing  the  Re  Wakim  case,  and  concluding  that the
Court displays no "general  pattern" or interpretive direction).
61.  Anthony Mason sat as the chief justice  from  1987  to  1995.  For a description of the
Mason  years  and those  that  followed, emphasizing  continuities  in interpretive  method,  see
Michael  McHugh, Justice  of the High Court  of Australia,  The Constitutional  Jurisprudence
of the  High Court,  1989-2004,  The Inaugural  Sir Anthony  Mason Lecture  in  Constitutional
Law  (Nov.  26,  2004),  available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/mchughj/mchughj-
26nov04.html.  For a  different  perspective,  see  Jason  L.  Pierce,  Inside  the  Mason  Court
Revolution (2006).
62.  (1989)  168 C.L.R. 461  (Austl.).
63.  Id.  at 481-83 (Mason, C.J.).  Section  117 of the Australian Constitution provides,  "A
subject of the  Queen,  resident  in  any  State,  shall not  be subject  in  any  other State to  any
2006] 935FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
separate  opinions  by  seven justices--disavowed  earlier  interpretations  of
section  117  of  the  Australian  Constitution,  finding  that  it  was  more
consistent with the purpose of making a unified country to interpret the ban
on discrimination based on state residence more broadly.64
Several  of  the  justices  were  quite  candid  in  describing  how  recent
developments  influenced  their understanding  of the  clause.  For  example,
Justice  Mary  Gaudron  wrote  that  the  prior  decisions  interpreting  section
117  "do  not  reflect  recent  developments  within  the  field  of  anti-
discrimination  law  which have led  to an  understanding  that  discrimination
may  be constituted  by  acts or decisions  having  a discriminatory  effect  or
disparate  impact  (indirect  discrimination)  as  well  as  by  acts  or  decisions
based on discriminatory  considerations  (direct discrimination),"  relying  on
both  Australian  and  American  statutes  and  cases  interpreting  them.65
Arguing  against  the  constitutional  formalism  of  past  decisions,  Justice
William  Deane  asserted  that  the  requirement  for  residency  or  primary
practice  as  a  condition  to  practicing  law  in  a  state  must  be  found  in
violation of section  117,  "[i]n  the light of the material  before the Court and
in  the  context  of  modem  circumstances  in  this  country  including  the
existence  of a unitary system of law administered  in the various  States  and
Territories  by both  national  and  State courts  ....  *"66  And Justice  Gerard
Brennan  wrote  that  to  continue  to  insist  on  a  formal,  and  narrow
understanding  of section  117,  ignoring  subsequent  developments  in  the
understanding of discrimination,  would be to "fossilize"  section  117.67  The
presence  of an evolutionary  approach to interpretation, based on a range of
legal  developments,  is thus apparent even in the Australian  case  law,68  and
while  observers have identified  some retrenchment  since the change  in the
disability  or  discrimination  which  would  not  be  equally  applicable  to  him  if  he  were  a
subject of the Queen resident  in such other state."  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act,  1900,  §  117.  The prior doctrine essentially limited the prohibition to statutes involving
direct classifications concerning domicile  only. See Henry  v. Boehm  (1973)  128 C.L.R. 482
(Austl.);  see also Davies  and  Jones  v.  Western  Australia  (1904)  2  C.L.R.  29.  Henry  v.
Boehm was overruled in Queensland  Bar. See infra notes 64, 67.
64.  See,  e.g.,  Queensland Bar (1989)  168  C.L.R.  at  485-86  (Mason,  C.J.);  id.  at  512
(Brennan, J.); id. at 545-49  (Dawson, J.).
65.  Id.  at 566 (Gaudron,  J.).
66.  Id.  at 531 (Deane, J.).
67.  Id.  at 518  (Brennan,  J.)  ("[T]he  developments  of the  law  since  [Henry v. Boehm]
have  given  us  new  insights  into  the  law  of  discrimination  and  those  insights  reveal
shortcomings  in  the  reasons  of the  majority.  To  adhere  to  Henry v. Boehm  would  be  to
fossilize  s.  117 while the general law of discrimination continues to develop.").
68.  Also  apparent  is  an  increased  tendency  to  refer  to  foreign  law.  See,  e.g.,  Brian
Opeskin,  Australian Constitutional Law in a  Global Era, in  Reflections on  the Australian
Constitution  184,  187  (Robert  French,  Geoffrey  Lindell  &  Cheryl  Saunders  eds.,  2003)
(demonstrating  that since  1980, the  Australian  High  Court's citations  to foreign  sources  in
deciding constitutional  issues has increased).  For an argument by Australian Justice Michael
Kirby that  the constitution  ought to be interpreted  in light of international  human rights  law
when  the  constitution  itself  is  ambiguous,  see  Michael  Kirby,  International  Law:  The
Impact on National Constitutions,  21 Am. U.  Int'l L. Rev. 327,  342 (2005)  (Seventh  Annual
Grotius  Lecture  before  the  American  Society  of International  Law).  However,  no  other
justices of  the Australian High Court have gone this far. See id.
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Court's  membership  in  1995,  relative  to  earlier  periods  the  Court's
approach remains less formal and more eclectic.69
Thus,  constitutional  courts  in  other  well-functioning  democracies  have
not found it of critical importance either to limit their interpretive process to
a narrow view of original intent nor to a small  set of relatively constrained
arguments.  Indeed,  Professor Goldsworthy,  editor of a recent comparative
study of constitutional  interpretation  and himself a proponent  in Australia
of what  he has termed "moderate  originalism,"  comments,  "[i]nterpretation
everywhere  is  guided by  similar  considerations,  including the  ordinary  or
technical-legal  meanings  of  words,  evidence  of their  originally  intended
69.  The Mason Court (1987-1995), was followed by the Brennan Court (1995-1998);  the
Chief  Justice  since  1998  has  been  Murray  Gleeson.  As  one  Australian  legal  scholar
commented in response to an earlier draft of this paper,
Beginning with  the Mason  Court  in  the  mid-1980's,  the High  Court of Australia
has repeatedly endorsed  a common  law or 'living  tree'  approach  to Constitutional
interpretation.  The  current  court,  the  Gleeson  Court,  has  tended  to  take  a
somewhat  more  restrained,  backward-looking  approach  to  interpretation,  but  a
majority  of that  Court  has  continued  to  reject  a  strictly  originalist  or textualist
approach to interpretation.
E-mail  from Rosalind  Dixon to author (Aug.  15,  2006) (quoted with permission, on  file with
the Fordham Law Review).  As an example, see SGH Ltd. v. Comm 'r of Taxation (2002) 210
C.L.R. 51,  75 (Austl.)  (Gummow, J.).  Justice William Gummow wrote,
Questions  of construction  of the  Constitution  are not  to  be answered  by  the
adoption and application of any particular,  all-embracing  and revelatory theory  or
doctrine of interpretation.  Nor are they answered by the resolution of a perceived
conflict between  rival  theories,  with  the placing  of the  victorious  theory  upon  a
high ground occupied by the modem, the enlightened and the elect.
The  provisions  of the Constitution,  as  an  instrument  of federal  government,
and the issues which arise thereunder  from time to time for judicial determination
are too  complex  and  diverse  for either of the  above  courses  to be  a  satisfactory
means  of discharging  the  mandate  which  the  Constitution  itself  entrusts  to  the
judicial power of the Commonwealth  ....  The state of the law of the Constitution
at any given time is to be perceived by study of both the constitutional  text and of
the Commonwealth Law Reports. Decisions of this Court dealing with the text and
structure of the  Constitution but not bearing  directly  upon  a particular  provision
nevertheless  may  cast  a  different  light  upon  that  provision  and  so  influence  its
interpretation.
This  indicates..,  that  questions  of constitutional interpretation are  not
determined simply  by  linguistic considerations which pertained a  century ago.
Nevertheless,  those  considerations  are  not  irrelevant;  it  would  be  to  pervert  the
purpose  of the judicial power if, without recourse  to the mechanism  provided by
s 128  and entrusted  to the Parliament  and the  electors,  the Constitution  meant no
more  than  what  it  appears  to  mean  from  time  to  time  to  successive  judges
exercising the jurisdiction provided for in Ch III of the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis  added);  see also McHugh, supra note  61,  at  text accompanying  notes  13-19,
98  (noting  the  argument  that  the  Gleeson  Court  has  returned  to  a  former  "legalism"  but
concluding  that  there  was  "no  discernible  break  in  the judicial  method  applied  by  the
majority in the Gleeson,  Brennan and Mason Courts;" that majorities on all used the tools of
common  law  constitutional  method;  and  finding  on  the  Gleeson  Court  "a  consensus  that
questions  of  constitutional  interpretation  are  not  determined  simply  by  linguistic
considerations  that  pertained  a century ago");  see also supra note 60  (describing  Professor
Zines's  view  as  of 2000).  But cf  Simon  Evans,  Developments-Australia:  Mandatory
Administrative Detention, 4  Int'l J. Const. L. 517,  530  (2006)  (stating that a "positivist and
formalist approach"  is now  ascendent).
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meaning  or  purpose,  'structural'  or  'underlying'  principles,  judicial
precedents,  scholarly  writings,  comparative  and  international  law,  and
contemporary understandings ofjustice and social utility. '7 0
Robert  Bork,  and  others,  may claim that these  interpretive  overlaps  are
the manifestation  of the  "New  Class" of "cultural[ly]  left"  elites that have
come to dominate western  courts.71  But the idea that this is an illegitimate,
anti-democratic  power grab  must be reconciled  with  its regular occurrence
in countries most highly rated for democratic, civil, and political freedoms 72
and  with  the  potential  of multi-sourced  interpretive  approaches  to  yield
"conservative"  as  well  as "liberal"  results.  Perhaps,  some  might  still  say,
these interpretive approaches  reflect institutional power grabs by the courts.
But let me suggest instead some  features of the work  of the  courts and  the
changing legal context that may offer different explanations.
First,  contemporary  constitutional  courts  that  have  been  successful  in
judicial  review  over  a  long  period  of  time  face  the  problem  of  the
debilitation, over time, of the democratic  or popular  sovereignty  rationales
for adherence  to more specific original intentions.  That is, the further out in
time one is from the original body that enacted  and agreed to a constitution,
the more difficult it is to treat past expressed intentions as binding (based on
the democratic  legitimacy of the initial body) on today's  voters, legislators,
or  those  acting  under  current  law.  Rule-of-law  considerations  require
70.  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Introduction: The Challenges of Constitutional  Interpretation,
in Interpreting Constitutions:  A Comparative  Study, supra  note  20, at  1, 5.
71.  See  Robert  H.  Bork,  Coercing  Virtue:  The  Worldwide  Rule  of Judges  2-3,  5-10
(2003);  see  also  Kenneth  Kersch,  The  New  Legal  Transnationalism, the  Globalized
Judiciary  and the Rule of  Law, 4 Wash. U. Global  Stud. L.  Rev. 345 (2005).
72.  See supra note 27.  Some political scientists attribute the spread of judicial review to
a  desire  to  contain  the  effects  of increased  democratization  of politics.  See,  e.g.,  Tom
Ginsburg, Judicial  Review  in New  Democracies:  Constitutional  Courts  in Asian Cases  18
(2003)  (describing  judicial  review  as  "political  insurance");  Ran  Hirschl,  Towards
Juristocracy:  The  Origins  and Consequences  of the New  Constitutionalism  7-8,  17-30,  38-
49 (2004)  (describing the development of  judicial review in settings without obvious  regime
transition  as a response to the expansion  of majoritarian politics,  involving  efforts by older
political  elites,  together  with  economic  and judicial  elites,  at  self-interested  "hegemonic
preservation");  cf  Matthew  C.  Stephenson,  "When  the Devil Turns...  ":  The  Political
Foundations of Independent Judicial  Review,  32  J. Legal  Stud. 59 (2003)  (concluding  that
support for independent judicial review depends, inter alia, on the presence of a competitive
political  system).  In  light  of the spread  of human rights  consciousness,  it is  unlikely  that
explanations  that  sound  in self-interested  elite protectionism  tell  the whole  story.  Another
part of the  story may well be the support, from those not in power, for judicial  human rights
enforcement,  or  the  desire  to  manage  conflict  through  law  rather  than  violence,  which  is
itself more conducive to the protection of democratic  civil liberties.  Both elements appeared
to have been  at  work in  South African constitutional politics of the early  1990s. See Heinz
Klug, Constituting Democracy:  Law, Globalism and South Africa's Political Reconstruction
(2000);  Ruti  Teitel,  Transitional Jurisprudence:  The  Role  of  Law  in  Political
Transformation, 106  Yale  L.J.  2009,  2059-60  (1997)  (treating  the  South  African  interim
constitution as  important in affirming liberal values through protecting rights of equality and
thus aiding post-apartheid  transition to more legitimate government).
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adherence  to  valid  written  law,  but  the  interpretive  force  of  original
intentions tends to weaken over time.73
Second, a related set of changes in legal consciousness  over the course of
the  20th  century  has  occurred.  The plausibility  of claims  that texts  have
entirely  fixed  meanings  has  come  under  assault  not  only  in  law  but  in
literature  and  history,  leading-at  a minimum-to  increased  debate  about
defining  meaning at appropriate levels of generality.74  Relatedly,  there has
been  a  decline  in  lawyers'  and judges'  abilities  to  see  formalism  as  a
representation  of legal reality,  as a result of the critiques  of Legal Realists
and  Critical  Legal  Scholars.75 Both  of these  phenomena  contributed  to  a
decline  in confidence  in any  one  source  as appropriate  in  identifying  (and
constraining) constitutional meaning.
An  additional  set of changes  in legal  consciousness,  arguably  related  to
the  first,  must  also  be  noted:  Contemporary  legal  consciousness  places
much  greater  weight  on  values  of democracy  in  the  sense  of tying  the
legitimacy of governance  to widespread  suffrage,  extended on equal terms,
to all or most  adult citizens, than did conceptions of self-governance  in the
18th  or  even  19th  centuries.  This  emerging  democratic  consciousness,
manifest  in  Tom Franck's  suggestion  in the  early  1990s  that international
law might be coming to recognize  a right of democratic self-government, 76
is more  explicit in arguments  that the legitimacy of constitutions  may  now
rest on popular participation  in their drafting and ratification.77  The greater
emphasis  in  contemporary  (at least Western)  legal  thought on the need for
constitutions  to  be  grounded  in  a  participatory,  democratic  process  may
work  to  undermine  theories  of original  intention  with  respect  to the  U.S.
Constitution,  whose  principal  portions  (including  the  rigid  amendability
73.  But cf Randy  E.  Barnett,  Restoring  the  Lost  Constitution  100-09  (2004)  (linking
justifications  for  "public  meaning"  originalism  to  the  fact  of  a  written  constitution).
Professor  Barnett  argues  that  only  by  interpreting  its words  in  accord  with  their  original
public  meanings  can  the  written  Constitution  serve  its  purpose  of  constraining  the
government.  Id. at  103-09,  117.  Drawing  an  analogy  to  contract  law,  he  argues  that  the
reason  why the  Constitution  was written  was  to  constrain  the  future.  Professor  Barnett's
thoughtful and sophisticated  argument  nonetheless  rests  on too narrow an understanding  of
why constitutions are written and ignores how  constitutions are different  from contracts.  As
I discuss  elsewhere,  see Jackson supra note  25,  the  suggestion  that if interpretation  is  not
constrained  by original  public  meaning,  written  words  cannot  constrain  at  all  is  likewise
mistaken:  Written  texts are neither wholly determinate  nor wholly indeterminate,  and their
interpretation can  be constrained  by other legal  sources (e.g.,  precedent)  and understandings
(e.g., of the role of a court in a self-governing democracy)  as well as by original meanings.
74.  For discussion  of the interpretive  tradition of written  texts  in Jewish  religious  law,
see Elliot N. Dorff & Arthur Rosett,  A Living Tree:  The Roots and Growth of Jewish  Law
14,  185-90, 200, 565  (1988)  (exploring how exegesis replaces prophecy and how interpretive
tradition in Jewish law provides both continuity and flexibility).
75.  Cf  Pierce,  supra note  61,  at  25  (describing  the  Mason  Court  in  Australia  as
"usher[ing]  legal realism  into a judicial culture long-steeped in formalism").
76.  See Thomas M. Franck,  The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am.  J.
Int'l L. 46 (1992).
77.  See, e.g.,  Vivien  Hart, Democratic  Constitution Making (U.S. Inst. of Peace,  Special
Rep.  107,  July  2003), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr107.html  (last
visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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provisions  of Article  V)  were  drafted  and  ratified  at  periods  when  most
women  and  racial  minorities  were  ineligible  to  vote;  in  Australia,  whose
1900  Constitution  was  ratified  by  an  overwhelmingly  male  electorate
(women being excluded from the vote in most of the states) and in a process
that excluded aboriginal  persons from participation;  and (possibly) even in
Germany, where  the  Basic  Law was drafted  under  constraints  imposed  by
the  Allied  occupation  forces  and  was  not  adopted  by  referendum  but  by
votes  of  the  l~inder  legislatures. 78  While  the  emphasis  on  democratic
participation  might  be  thought  to  be  at  odds  with  any judicial  review  of
legislation,79 in empirical terms  that is not the case:  Strongly participatory
efforts at constitution-making  in recent years, such as in South Africa, have
also provided for independent constitutional courts.80  But the effect may be
to reinforce  interpretive  approaches  that permit  current  understandings  of
constitutional  terms  and  ideas  to  play  a  role.  Thus  constitutional  courts
engaged  in judicial  review  may  be  responding  to  the  perceived  need  to
justify their  use of such  a power  to invalidate  arguably  more  majoritarian
norms,81  and doing so  in an environment  which embodies  a consciousness
that did not exist in the  18th or mid- 19th century.
Whatever  the reasons,  constitutional  adjudication  in these  four countries
proceeds  through  legal  argument  based  on  several  different  kinds  of
sources,  including  the  constitution's  text,  its  structure  and  history,  the
original understandings  and intentions of its drafters, the respective  court's
prior  jurisprudence,  the  consequences  of  interpretive  choices,  and,  on
occasion,  consideration  of international  or  foreign  law.  Over  time  both
continuities  and  change  emerge  in  the  doctrinal  interpretations  and
applications  of the  same constitutional  texts, justified by reference  to new
developments,  new  experiences,  or  revised  understandings.  While  the
78.  More  speculatively,  if one  believes  that  constitutional  courts  have  a  persuasive
function  of justifying  their  decisions  to  relevant  audiences,  then  the  democratization  of
voting may imply that the persuasive function of constitutional courts is no longer limited,  if
ever it was, to legal elites.  Rather, at least potentially,  there is a broad audience  for judicial
decisions,  and  with  a  broader  audience  a  broader array  of arguments  may  be  helpful  in
explaining decisions.  Although the literature  suggests  low public  attention  to the reasoning
of  most judicial  opinions,  see  Stephen  B.  Burbank,  Alternative  Career Resolution II:
Changing  the Tenure of Supreme Court  Justices, 154  U. Pa. L.  Rev.  1511,  1527-28  (2006),
mass  media  on occasion  devotes  time  to  legal  reasoning  in ways  that may  affect  general
impressions  of the  legitimacy  of the  courts'  work.  See,  e.g.,  Adam  Liptak, Many Experts
Fault  Reasoning of  Judge in Surveillance Ruling, N.Y.  Times, Aug. 19,  2006, at Al.
79.  As I explore  in other work, the idea that a constitution, written  before any of us was
born, constrains  democratically  elected  legislatures  is  itself in tension  with some  values of
democratic self-government; yet it is central  to the rule of law.  Rule-of-law concerns require
that  constitutional  interpretation  be  seen  and  practiced  as  a  form  of law,  and  with  the
constraints of legal discourse, but do not necessarily require any one interpretive approach.
80.  See S.  Afr. Const. 1996,  §§  166-67,  172,  174,  176.
81.  Cf  David  S.  Law,  Generic Constitutional  Law,  89  Minn.  L.  Rev.  652,  661-98
(2005)  (providing  positive  account  of  mechanisms  by  which  "generic,"  or  shared,
constitutional  law  develops,  including,  inter  alia,  that  "constitutional  courts  experience  a
common theoretical  need to justify  the sometimes countermajoritarian  institution  of judicial
review"  and necessarily employ balancing and means-ends analyses to justify decisions).
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similarities  between  the  interpretive practices  of these constitutional  courts
do not answer a range of normative questions that interpretive theories  must
address,  they do  suggest that the  interpretive  challenges  are  shared.  And
while  interpretive  theories  are  most  useful  if  they  account  for  current
interpretive  practices,82  our  own  interpretive  debates  sometimes  seem  to
degenerate  into caricature  and  antinomy, missing  the rather  large  areas  of
overlap in the interpretive practices of most justices.
II.  Do METAPHORS MATTER?  CONSTITUTIONS  AS LIVING TREES
Interpretive battles  in the United  States pitch the "living  constitution," 83
whose  content  can  change  not  only  through  amendment  but  through
interpretation,  against  an  unmovable  "original"  Constitution  intended  to
"obstruct modernity, '84 whose meaning was fixed at some point in the past,
changeable  only  by  the Article  V  amendment  process.85  Poised  as  polar
82.  See Richard  H.  Fallon, Jr.,  How to Choose a Constitutional  Theory, 87  Cal. L. Rev.
535,  537-38,  544-45,  560-62  (1999)  (describing  different  theoretical  views  about  "fit"
between theory and constitutional  text or constitutional practice  and noting that, in addition
to meeting  substantive  criteria,  a  theory  should  be  broadly  acceptable); see also David A.
Strauss,  Wat Is  Constitutional Theory?,  87  Cal.  L.  Rev.  581,  582  (1999)  (arguing  that
constitutional  theory  is  both  prescriptive  and  descriptive,  "because  it  cannot  call  for  a
wholesale departure from existing practices").
83.  See,  e.g.,  Morton  J.  Horwitz,  Foreword:  The  Constitution of  Change:  Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107  Harv.  L.  Rev.  32,  41  (1993).  The  term
"living  constitution"  goes  much  further  back.  See,  e.g.,  Howard  Lee  McBain,  The  Living
Constitution:  A  Consideration  of the  Realities  and  Legends  of Our  Fundamental  Law
(1927).  Critics  of the "living  constitution"  approach  sometimes  suggest  that it  is  entirely
unconstrained  by  anything but judges'  "preferences,"  but  this  is  a caricature.  Significant
differences  about  interpretation  concern  the  levels  of  generality  at  which  original
understandings  are taken and the  scope they allow  for considerations of other sources,  most
of which  (e.g.,  precedent, consequences of differing interpretations  in light of constitutional
purposes,  other historic practices) are relied on by most judges at least some of the time. Cf
Michael  W.  McConnell,  Active  Liberty:  A  Progressive Alternative  to  Textualism  and
Originalism?, 119  Harv.  L.  Rev.  2387,  2390-91  (2006)  (book  review)  (praising  Justice
Stephen Breyer's book for "remind[ing]  us that American jurisprudence  rests on a broad and
usually consensual base"  and that "all judges  'use  similar basic tools'  (text, textual  context,
history, tradition,  precedents, evidence regarding purpose, and 'likely  consequences')").
84.  Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution, in Constitutional Justice Under Old
Constitutions  313  (Eivind  Smith  ed.,  1995)  [hereinafter  Scalia,  Modernity  and  the
Constitution].  For examples  of Justice  Scalia's  use  of the  terms  "dead  Constitution"  and
"enduring  Constitution,"  see  Antonin  Scalia,  On  Interpreting  the  Constitution,  The
Manhattan  Institute Wriston  Lecture  (Nov.  17,  1997),  available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/wl1997.htm  (unedited  transcript)  ("Come  along  with  me  and  admire  the
Dead  Constitution. I have to get a new term  for  it ....  [M]aybe  the Enduring Constitution.
That's  a little better."); see also Antonin  Scalia,  God's Justice and Ours, First Things, May
2002,  at  17,  available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0205/articles/scalia.html  ("As
it is,  however,  the  Constitution that  I interpret  and  apply  is not  living  but  dead-or, as I
prefer to put it, enduring.").
85.  I do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  metaphorical  fight  is  the  same  as  the  interpretive
battle-there are many highly developed theories of constitutional interpretation, some in the
more "fixed"  constitution  school,  some  in the  "living" constitution  school.  Nor is  the only
important argument about how to interpret,  given theories about who  should interpret,  some
of which argue that the Constitution  does not belong in the courts-at all, or very much,  or
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opposites in American legal culture today, the "original  constitution" seems
to  have significant  appeal over the "living constitution."  The narratives  of
the  U.S.  "founding"  hold  much  that  is  attractive  in  the  national
consciousness:  Given  the  impoverished  discourse  and absence  of visible
public virtues  of self-restraint  in today's national  elected politics, a  choice
that  is  expressed  as  being  between  the  "Founding  Fathers"  and  anyone
living today  makes  it likely that nostalgia  will trump.86  Yet  each of these
shorthands is misleading.
All  but  the  most  rigid  originalists  allow  room  for  the  operation  of
precedent through the doctrine of stare decisis, 87  so the "Constitution"  they
defend  looks  quite  remote  from  specific  18th  or  19th  century
understandings.  And  if  other  originalists  allow  that  some  parts  of the
Constitution  articulate  "concepts"  intended  to  evolve  over  time,88  the
legitimate  gap  between  then  and  now  is  even  greater.  So  most
"originalists,"  it might be said, recognize that some change  in constitutional
interpretation  is  appropriate  or inevitable.  On the  other hand,  the  "living
constitution"  metaphor,  like  the  Australian  "living  force"  metaphor,89  is
oddly  disembodied:  What  form  of  life  is  it?  It  brings  to  mind  an
amorphous  mass,  with  possibilities  that constitutional  law  is  untethered  to
anything but current judges'  preferences.  In this respect it is misleading  as
a metaphorical  inscription of current practices.  Original understandings  and
constitutional texts and past precedents  continue to play an important role in
interpretive  practices,  and  for  good  reason.  Constitutions  serve  many
purposes  and  among  these  is  to  provide  links  with  a  society's  past  and
enduring commitments.
The "living  constitution" phrase does capture the idea of the Constitution
as  something  that  grows  and  is  subject  to  contest  and  interpretation  by
not  exclusively.  See,  e.g.,  Mark  Tushnet,  Taking  the  Constitution  Away  from  the  Courts
(1999);  Larry  D.  Kramer,  Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004,  92  Cal.  L.  Rev.  959
(2004).
86.  What  political  figure  today  in  the  United  States  has  the  kind  of heroic,  and  self-
restraining qualities attributed to those who fought the Revolutionary War and participated in
the  Constitutional  Convention?  For  a  description  of  the  first  President's  restraint  and
perceived  public  virtue,  see  Garry  Wills,  Cincinnatus:  George  Washington  and  the
Enlightenment  1-84  (1984)  (describing  how  Washington's  resignation  contributed  to  his
"secular charisma" and how  he "perfected the art of getting power by giving it away").
87.  See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional  Interpretation  98 n.50, 214 (1991)  (quoting Bork's
testimony  in  his  confirmation  hearing,  saying "anybody  who tries  to follow  original  intent
must also have a respect  for precedent because some things it's too late to change").  But see,
e.g., Randy  E.  Barnett,  Trumping Precedent With  Original  Meaning:  Not as Radical as it
Sounds, 22 Const. Comment. 257, 262-66 (2005)  (arguing that precedent should be followed
only insofar as  it does  not conflict with the original public meaning of the Constitution).
88.  Cf Goldsworthy,  Originalism,  supra note 57, at 20-21 (1997)  (discussing "moderate
originalism").  On  specific  versus abstract  intentions,  or "concepts"  versus  "conceptions,"
see  Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law:  The Moral Reading of the American  Constitution  76
(1996);  Ronald  Dworkin,  Taking  Rights  Seriously  134-35  (1977)  [hereinafter  Dworkin,
Taking Rights  Seriously].
89.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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subsequent  generations9 0 -indeed,  that  part  of  what  has  made  the
Constitution  workable  over  time  has  been  the  practice  of  evolving
interpretation  and its openness  to competing  lines of argument.91  But what
the "living constitution" phrase does not capture  is the idea that part of what
makes  the Constitution  a fundamental  law  is its inscription  in written  form
through  legal  processes of adoption  and ratification  accepted  by sufficient
numbers of people as a legitimate exercise of self-government.
92
At least one other western  democracy,  Canada, sees its constitutional law
as  a "living  tree"-a  metaphor  that  in some ways better  captures  the  idea
that even a "living"  document is constrained by its origins.  Trees, after all,
are rooted,  in ways that  other living organisms are not.  The phrase  is from
the opinion of Lord Chancellor Sankey,  in Edwards v. Attorney-General  for
Canada (also  known  as  the  "Persons  Case"),93  a  decision  of the  British
Privy  Council  involving an  interpretive  question that  had arisen  under  the
Canadian constitution, which had been enacted  in the form of a  statute, the
British North America Act,  1867.
94  The question was whether women were
among those who  could  serve  as members  of the Canadian  Senate;  it was,
in a sense,  a question of gender equality, decided under a constitutional act
that made no provision for either a general principle  of equality of persons
or a specific ban on sex discrimination.
Section  24  of the  British  North  America  Act,  1867  provided  for  the
appointment of "qualified  Persons" to the Senate.95  Section 23 of the  1867
Act defined the qualifications of a senator in the masculine voice, e.g., "He
shall  be  ...  "  and  among  the  requirements  was  that  the  person  hold
90.  Cf  Keith  E.  Whittington,  Reconstructing the  Federal Judiciary:  The  Chase
Impeachment  and the  Constitution, 9  Stud.  Am.  Pol.  Dev.  55,  99  (1995)  (describing
arguments  by proponents  of the  impeachment  and  removal  from  office  of Supreme  Court
Justice  Samuel  Chase  that  the  writtenness  of the  Constitution enables  contest and  dispute
over its meaning;  a written constitution  can  "resist previous bad  interpretations attributed  to
it"  and  "the  court[s]  should  always  be  available  to  hear  reargument  and  criticism  of its
precedents").
91.  I  elaborate  on  this  point and  offer  other normative  defenses  of a  "common  law"
approach in Jackson, supra note 25.
92.  Cf David  A. Strauss,  Common Law, Common  Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112  Yale L.J.  1717,  1731-35  (2003)  (arguing  that the text provides  a "common  ground" and
that it is a "convention"  that the text is authoritative).  My argument goes beyond Strauss's, I
think:  What  supports  the  conventionalism  of treating  the  text  as  binding  is  the  special
legitimacy  of fundamental  written  law,  adopted through  legal  procedures  accepted  in our
legal culture. See Jackson, supra  note 25.
93.  [1930] A.C. 124  (P.C. 1929)  (appeal taken from Can.).
94.  The British North America Act,  1867 (which in  1982 was renamed the "Constitution
Act,  1867") was,  formally, not an  "act" of a self-governing  polity but a statutory  enactment
of the British Parliament for its Canadian domain. See Constitution Act,  1867,  30 &  31 Vict.
Ch.  3 (U.K.), as reprinted  in R.S.C., No. 5  (Appendix  1985).  Yet, at a substantive  level, the
1867  Act  was  an  act  of self-governance  in  that  it  embodied  an  agreement  worked  out
between  the  French  and  English  communities  of British  North  America,  embodied  in  a
written  document  that was  then  enacted  into  law  by  the  British  Parliament.  See Peter  W.
Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of Canada  38  (4th  ed.  1997);  Robert  C.  Vipond,  Liberty  &
Community:  Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution  16-17 (1991).
95.  Constitution Act,  1867,  § 24.
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property  of certain types and amounts  and be  a citizen.96  In  a proceeding
initiated  by  the  government  on  the  request  of five  women,  the  Supreme
Court of Canada unanimously concluded that the phrase "qualified Persons"
in section  24  excluded  women  from  those  who  could be  appointed  to  the
Senate.97  Four judges  relied  on  the  common  law  disability  of women to
hold public  office,  which,  they  indicated,  would  have  been  understood  at
the  time of enactment  in  1867  to exclude  women  from serving  by election
or appointment  in public  office.98  These arguments were reinforced,  in the
Court's view, by a prior Privy Council decision indicating that the  1867 Act
was a  statute  and should be interpreted  like other statutes. 99  Accordingly,
the Canadian  Court wrote,  the words  of section  24 must  "bear  to-day the
same  construction  which  the courts  would,  if then  required  to  pass  upon
them, have given  to them when they  were  first enacted."' 00  And it would
be  a  "striking  constitutional  departure"  from  the  common  law  to  permit
women  to  be  eligible  to  sit,  an  innovation  that,  if it  had  been  intended,
would  have  been  made  express.' 0'  A  fifth judge,  Justice  Lyman  Poore
Duff,  disagreed  with  the  majority's  reliance  on  general  common  law
presumptions but reached the same conclusion on other grounds. 1 02
96.  Id. § 23.
97.  See Reference  re Meaning of the  Word "Persons"  in Section  24 of the British North
America Act, 1867, [1928]  S.C.R. 276 (Can.), rev'd, Edwards v. Att'y-Gen. for Can.,  [1930]
A.C.  124,  136 (P.C.  1929)  (appeal taken from Can.).
98.  They placed  particular weight  on an  earlier British  case  construing an  election  law
not to  include  women.  See  id. at  290  (citing  Chorlton  v.  Lings,  (1868)  L.R. 4  C.P.  374)
("[Chorlton] is  conclusive  against the  petitioners alike on  the question of the  common  law
incapacity  of women  to exercise such public functions as those of a member of the Senate of
Canada and  on  that  of their being  expressly excluded  from  the class of 'qualified  persons'
within  s.  24  of  the  [British  North  America]  Act  by  the  terms  in  which  s.  23  is
couched  .... ").  In  Choriton,  at  issue was  whether  section 3 of the  Representation  of the
People  Act,  1867,  30 &  31  Vict. ch.  102,  which entitled  every "man"  to vote, also entitled
women to vote, in light of section  4 of Lord Brougham's Act of 1850,  13 &  14 Vict.  ch. 21,
providing  that  in  all  Acts  words  importing  the  masculine  gender  are  deemed  to  include
women  "unless  the  contrary...  is  expressly  provided."  The  four  judges  who  issued
opinions  in  the  Court  of Common  Pleas  in  Chorlton all  concluded  that women  were  not
entitled to vote, notwithstanding Lord Brougham's Act.  See Chorlton, (1868)  L.R. 4  C.P. at
382-87  (Bovill,  C.J.);  id. at  387-92  (Willes,  J.);  id. at  392-94  (Byles,  J.);  id. at  394-97
(Keating, J.).
99.  Reference re Meaning of the Word "Persons," [1928]  S.C.R. at 282  (citing Bank of
Toronto  v.  Lambe,  [1887]  12  A.C.  575  (P.C.)  (appeal  taken  from  Can.)).  In  Bank  of
Toronto, the Privy  Council alluded to  the reasoning  in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17  U.S. (4
Wheat.)  316 (1819),  but held that it had no application  to the issue before it, interpreting the
language  of an  Act  of  Parliament  (the  1867  Act)  establishing  a  "carefully  balanced
constitution." Bank of Toronto, 12 A.C. at 587.
100.  Reference re Meaning of  the Word "Persons," [1928] S.C.R. at  282.
101.  Id. at285.
102.  Focusing  on  the  intent  of the  1867  Act  with  respect  to  the  Senate,  Justice  Duff
concluded  that  sections  23  and  24  precluded  women  from  serving  in  light  of  prior
understandings  specifically  excluding  women  from  eligibility  to  sit  in  the  Senate  and
because,  unlike other provisions  for the composition  of the  Canadian  House of Commons,
the Canadian Parliament was disabled from changing the Senate. Id. at 291-302.
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At this time, the Supreme Court of Canada  was not the final word on the
meaning  of the  1867  Act-the  British  Privy  Council  had jurisdiction  to
review  Canadian  Supreme  Court  decisions.  And  the  Privy  Council
disagreed,  both  on the  proper  interpretive  approach  and  on  its judgment.
After  discussing  possible  bases  for ambiguity  on  the  question  of original
understanding,  Lord  Sankey  wrote  that  section  24  must  not  be  given  a
narrow  interpretation.  Signaling  a  reversal  of the  prior  Privy  Council
position  on  the  interpretation  of  the  1867  Act,  he  wrote,  "'The  Privy
Council, indeed,  has laid down that Courts of law must treat the provisions
of the British North America Act by the  same methods of construction and
exposition  which  they  apply to other  statutes.  But there are statutes and
statutes  ....  "103  Statutes  which  were  constitutions  were  to  be
distinguished  from other kinds of statutes  such  as those  imposing taxes  or
establishing criminal penalties:
The British North America Act planted in Canada  a living tree capable of
growth and expansion within its natural  limits.  The object of the Act was
to grant  a Constitution  to Canada.  "Like  all written  constitutions  it has
been subject to development through usage and convention." ' 1 0 4
The Privy Council explained that historic understandings  and practices of
women's exclusion  should not be controlling. 1 0 5  Custom and history could
not decide the matter, because "[c]ustoms  are apt to develop  into traditions
which are  stronger than law and remain  unchallenged  long after the  reason
for  them  has  disappeared."'1 6  With  respect  to  "extrinsic"  evidence,  the
Privy  Council  commented  that  "their  Lordships  do  not  think  it  right  to
apply  rigidly  to  Canada  of to-day  the  decisions  and  the  reasons  therefor
which commended themselves,  probably rightly, to those who had to apply
the  law  in  different  circumstances,  in  different  centuries,  to  countries  in
different stages of development."' 0 7
103.  Edwards  v.  Att'y-Gen.  for  Can.,  [1930]  A.C.  124,  136  (P.C.  1929)  (appeal  taken
from Can.)  (emphasis added) (quoting a Canadian treatise).
104.  Id. (emphasis added)  (quoting another Canadian treatise).
105.  Id. at  128 ("The  exclusion  of women from  all public offices  is a relic of days  more
barbarous  than  ours,.  . . [when]  the  necessity  of the  times  often  forced  on  man  customs
which  in later years were  not necessary.").  Further,  it noted, the  language  of section 24  is
itself  ambiguous,  because  the  word  "persons"  could  embrace  men  and  women;  statutes
enacted  "several centuries  ago" would not have included women in the intended meaning of
persons  eligible  for  public  office,  not  because  of  any  limitation  inherent  to  the  word
"persons"  but "because  at  common law a woman was  incapable of serving  a public office."
Id. at 134.  As to practice,  "[t]he  fact that no woman had  served or has claimed  to serve  such
an office is not of great weight when it is remembered that custom would have prevented the
claim being made or the point being contested." Id
106.  Id.
107.  Id. at  134-35  (emphasis  added).  It appears  that Lord  Sankey was  referring here  to
decisions  in  other  English cases  between  the  1860s  and  1922,  including  one  considering
another  1867  British  statute,  as  well  as  to  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court's  discussion  of
Roman  law.  See  id.  at  135  (referring  to  the  reasoning  below  concerning  "the  appeal  to
Roman law and to early English decisions").
2006]FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Turning to the "internal"  aspects of the  1867 Act, Lord Sankey explained
further the idea of a constitution as a "living  tree":
Their Lordships  do not conceive  it to  be [their] duty...  to cut down the
provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical  construction,  but rather to
give it a large  and  liberal  interpretation  so that the  Dominion to  a great
extent,  but  within  certain  fixed  limits,  may  be  mistress  in  her  own
house ....  108
Flexibility  of interpretation,  then,  was  linked  to  the  idea  of a  constitution
and  to  self-governance  in  Canada,  under  a constitution  "large"  enough  to
allow  for its  own  development.  Implicitly  echoing  the  reasoning  of John
Marshall  in McCulloch  v. Maryland, Lord  Sankey  continued,  "'That  Act
should be on all occasions  interpreted in a large, liberal and comprehensive
spirit,  considering  the  magnitude  of the subjects  with which  it purports  to
deal  in  very  few  words." ' 1 0 9  The  Privy  Council  thus  shifted  the  burden
from  that  implied  by  opinions  emphasizing  original  understandings  of
women's  eligibility  for  office,  instead  declaring  that  the  burden  was  on
those who would deny that the term "qualified persons"  includes women. I  10
This burden  could not be met for several  reasons,  including, as first on the
list, "the object of the Act-namely to provide a constitution  for Canada, a
responsible  and  developing  State,"  and,  second,  the ambiguity  of the  term
",person."I 1
Although  the  "liberal"  construction  of  the  word  "persons"  by  Lord
Sankey  in Edwards did not affect  the allocations  of power to  the national
and provincial  governments,  the "living  tree"  principle was  soon extended
to interpretations  of national powers.  In  1931  it was relied on to conclude
that  the  powers  of  the  national  government  in  Canada  extended  to
regulation of radio communications, even though radio was unknown at the
108.  Id. at  136.
109.  Id. at  137 (quoting from  arguments made in St. Catherine's  Milling & Lumber Co. v.
R.,  (1888)  14 App. Cas. 46, 50, as noted by a Canadian treatise writer).
110.  Id. at  137-38.  Contrary  to the  reasoning of the Canadian  Supreme Court, the Privy
Council concluded,  the qualifications  listed in section 23  for  being in the Senate  did not  by
implication  exclude  women, or married  women,  from the  purview  of "qualified  persons."
The  requirement  that  a  senator  be  a  property  holder  did not  by  implication  exclude  most
(married)  women,  since  the  Married  Women's  Property  Act  of  1859  permitted  married
women  to  own  property;  the  requirement  that  a  senator  be a natural  born  or naturalized
British subject did not  fail  to address and  thus  implicitly exclude  married women  since  the
nationality of women  who married those of British nationality was determined by the Aliens
Act of 1844. Id. at  139.
111. Id.  at  143.  The  Privy  Council  also  noted,  as  factors  leading  it to  reverse  the
Canadian Supreme Court, that (1) the term  "persons"  was used elsewhere in the 1867  Act in
a way  that  embraced  females,  (2) other  portions of the  1867 Act  used the  term  "male"  to
limit the class of persons  referred  to,  and (3) a British statute,  the  Interpretation  Act,  1889,
"provide[d]  that words importing the masculine  gender shall include  females." Id. at  139-40.
Lord Sankey had also noted with "interest"  that John Stuart Mill  had "moved an amendment
to secure  women's suffrage,..  .[by] leav[ing]  out the word "man"  in order to insert the word
"person"  instead,"  in  a  committee  of  the  British  House  of  Commons  considering  the
Representation  of the  People  bill  in  1867.  For  a  related  discussion,  see  supra note  98
(describing  the subsequent  Chorlton decision).
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time  of the  1867  Constitution  Act.1 12  Although  the  decision  in  the  1937
Labour Conventions Case retreated  from  the "living tree"  approach  to the
definition of national powers, 113 over time the "living  tree" view has come
to play  a significant  role  in the  Canadian  constitutional  law of federalism,
language  rights,  and  Charter  rights.  It  has  been  relied  on  in  the
interpretation of the scope  of federal and provincial powers  in  Canada on a
number  of occasions;  for example,  in  1979  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court
interpreted section  133  of the  1867  Act  to require  that Quebec  permit  the
use  of either French  or  English  before  Quebec's  administrative  agencies,
even  though  the  constitutional  text  referred  only  to  the  legislature  and
courts.  14  More recently,  it was invoked  in upholding  federal  power  over
parental leave  issues, as discussed above.
Indeed,  the  "living  tree"  metaphor  has  become  a  staple  in  Canadian
constitutional  law, both as applied to the provisions of the  1867  Act and  to
the  new  1982  Charter."15  Within two years  of the  Charter's  adoption, the
"living  tree"  analogy  was  invoked  in  its  interpretation.  In  1984,  Law
Society of Upper Canada  v. Skapinker asserted a continuity in the principle
112.  See Reference re Jurisdiction of Parliament to Regulate & Control Radio Commc'n,
[1931]  S.C.R.  541,  546,  affid, [1932]  A.C.  304  (P.C.)  (appeal  taken  from Can.);  see also
Reference  re Regulation & Control of Aeronautics  in Can.,  [1930] S.C.R. 663.
113.  See  Att'y-Gen.  for  Can.  v.  Att'y-Gen.  for  Ontario  (Labour Conventions Case),
[1937]  A.C.  326,  354  (P.C.)  (appeal  taken  from  Can.)  (referring  to  the  "watertight"
compartments of authority  under the 1867 Act in holding that the federal  government lacked
authority  to  implement treaties  (that  it could  enter  into)  where  the  subject  matter  was not
already  enumerated  to  the  federal  government  and  thus  lacked  authority  to  enact  federal
minimum  wage and working  conditions  statutes); see also Peter W. Hogg,  Canada: From
Privy Council to Supreme Court, in Interpreting Constitutions:  A Comparative  Study, supra
note 20, at 55,  63-64 (discussing the Labour Conventions Case).
114.  Att'y-Gen. of Quebec v. Blaikie,  [1979] 2  S.C.R. 1016.  As to regulations, "it would
truncate  the  requirement  of  s.  133  if account  were  not  taken of the  growth  of delegated
legislation ....  Id. at  1027.  As to adjudicatory  bodies, the Court concluded,
In the rudimentary state of administrative  law in 1867, it is not surprising that there
was  no  reference  to  non-curial  adjudicative  agencies.  Today,  they  play  a
significant role in the control of a wide range of individual  and corporate activities,
subjecting them to various norms of conduct which are at the same time limitations
on  the jurisdiction  of the  agencies  and  on  the  legal  position  of those  caught  by
them.
Id. at  1028.  It went on to say that  this mode of analysis  was supported by the Privy Council
decisions  in  the  Persons Case (quoting  the  living  tree  language)  and  the  Privy  Council
decision in Att'y-Gen. of Ontario. v. Att'y-Gen. of Can.,  [1947] A.C.  127, where
Viscount Jowitt said in the course of his discussion of the issues,  that "it  is, as their
Lordships think,  irrelevant  that the question  is one  that might have  seemed unreal
at  the  date  of the  British North America Act.  To  such  an  organic  statute  the
flexible  interpretation must be given which changing circumstances require."
Blaikie, [1979]  2 S.C.R. at 1029 (quoting Att'y-Gen. of Ontario,  [1947] A.C. at 154).
115.  Canada has had two major constitutional acts.  The first in 1867 established the basic
"structural"  constitution  for Canada, through  what was formally an  enactment of the British
Parliament;  subsequent amendments  also  had to  be made,  in form,  through  British statutes.
In  1982,  the  Charter  of Rights  and  Freedoms-a  written  bill  of rights-was  added  to  the
Canadian  constitution,  and  other  changes  were  made  to  "patriate"  the  constitution  and  to
give  Canadians  the legal  power  to  amend  their constitution  themselves  so  that the  British
Parliament no longer controls Canada's constitution.
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of flexible constitutional interpretation, explaining that the Charter, unlike a
statute,  is  a  part  of  the  Canadian  constitution,  and  as  a  constitution,  its
interpretation  must  be  "modulated  by  a  sense  of the  unknowns  of the
future.""16  In a  1991  case challenging  the  reapportionment  of districts  in
Saskatchewan,  Justice  Beverley McLachlin,  writing for the  majority of the
Court which upheld the new districting, noted that "the Charter  is engrafted
onto  the  living tree  that  is the Canadian  constitution  ....  Thus, to borrow
the words of Lord Sankey ...  it must be  viewed as  a living tree  capable  of
growth  and  expansion  within  its natural  limits." 117  What  this means,  the
Court  explained,  is that "the past plays  a critical  but non-exclusive  role  in
determining the content of the rights and freedoms granted  by the  Charter.
The tree  is  rooted in  past and present  institutions,  but  must be  capable  of
growth to meet the future."' 1 8  Echoing Justice  Brian Dickson's  analysis in
a freedom of religion case,l19 the Court wrote,
The right  to  vote, while  rooted  in  and hence  to  some  extent defined  by
historical and existing practices,  cannot be viewed as frozen  by particular
historical  anomalies.  What  must  be  sought  is  the  broader  philosophy
underlying  the historical  development  of the right to vote-a philosophy
which is capable of explaining the past and animating the future." 120
Although  the  Justices  of the  Canadian  Court  disagreed  on  whether  the
reapportionment  plan  passed  muster  under  the  Charter,  the  broader
interpretive  claims  made  in  the  majority  opinion  elicited  little  if  any
disagreement. 121  Canadian case  law now seems to accept that a hallmark of
constitutional,  as compared to statutory, interpretation is the need for "large,
liberal" interpretation. 1 22
116.  Law  Soc'y  of Upper  Can.  v.  Skapinker,  [1984]  1  S.C.R.  357,  366;  see  also id.
(noting  that  the  Charter  "cannot  be  readily  amended,"  and  that  the  "fine  and  constant
adjustment process of these constitutional  provisions is left by a tradition of necessity to  the
judicial  branch").  The  Court  added  that  because  the  Charter  is  designed  to  "serve  the
Canadian  community  for  a  long  time,"  a  "[niarrow  and  technical  interpretation,  if not
modulated  by  a sense  of the unknowns  of the future,  can  stunt the growth of the  law  and
hence the community  it serves." Id.
117.  Reference re Provincial  Electoral  Boundaries  (Saskatchewan),  [1991]  2  S.C.R.  158,
180 (internal  quotation marks omitted).
118.  Id.
119.  R. v. Big M  Drug Mart Ltd., [1985]  1 S.C.R. 295,  343-44 (Can.)  ("[T]he Charter  is
intended  to set  a standard  upon  which present as well as future legislation  is  to be  tested.
Therefore  the meaning  of the  concept  of freedom  of conscience  and  religion  is  not  to  be
determined solely  by the degree  to which  that right was  enjoyed by Canadians  prior to the
proclamation of the Charter.").
120.  Reference re Provincial  Electoral  Boundaries, [1991]  2 S.C.R. at  181.
121.  See  id. at  171  (Cory, J.,  dissenting,  with two others, but agreeing with the majority
opinion's  statement of the criteria  by which the right  to vote should  be interpreted). But cf
id. at  198  (Sopinka,  J.,  agreeing  with  the  majority's  judgment and  "substantially  with  its
reasons,"  but  differing  on  "the  approach  of interpretation"  and  stating  that  "the  primary
inquiry is  to determine  on what principles the right to vote, which has existed  in this country
for many years, was based").
122.  See also Reference  re  Section  94(2)  of the Motor  Vehicle  Act (British  Columbia),
[1985]  2  S.C.R. 486,  509 (rejecting  undue emphasis  on original  intent  as  inconsistent  with
the  constitution's  capacity  for growth  and  "adjustment").  The  Court  has also rejected  the
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The  "living  tree"  doctrine  seems  to  have  exceptions,  however,  and
implies  constraints  as  well  as  evolution.  Decisions  in  the  last  decade
concerning  the  provisions  for aboriginal  rights,  in  section  35  of the  1982
Constitution  Act, 123 have been  a source of controversy  over  the  degree  to
which  the  rights  protected  were  intended  to  be  "frozen,"  or  defined  by
practice  at a particular moment  in the past,  or more  dynamic.124  And in
2004  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court  upheld,  but  only  in  part,  the  federal
government's  power  to  enact  legislation  providing  for  civil  marriage  for
persons  of  the  same  sex.125  Under  section  91(26)  of the  1867  Act,  the
federal  government  has  the  power  to  determine  the  legal  capacity  for
marriage;  the  provinces,  under  section  92(12)  have  power  over  the
solemnization  of  marriage.  Against  arguments  that  the  constitutional
concept of marriage in the  1867 Act entrenched common law  definitions of
marriage  as  including  only  the  union  of a man  and  a  woman,  the  Court
wrote  that  "[t]he  'frozen  concepts'  reasoning  runs  contrary  to  one of the
most  fundamental principles of Canadian  constitutional interpretation:  that
our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation,
accommodates  and  addresses  the  realities  of modem  life."' 26   Relying
explicitly  on the Persons Case, the Court rejected arguments  that marriage
was a concept that could not admit of same  sex unions and that the  specific
intentions of the framers on the meaning of marriage should govern. 1 27 The
suggestion that the origin of the Canadian  constitution  in British Acts of Parliament  should
affect  its character,  or interpretive approaches to it as a constitution. See Law Soc'y of Upper
Can.  v.  Skapinker,  [1984]  1  S.C.R. 357,  365  ("The  adoptive  mechanisms  may vary  from
nation  to nation.  They lose their relevancy or shrink to mere historical  curiosity value on  the
ultimate adoption of the instrument as the Constitution.").
123.  Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples  of Canada,  §  35,  Part  II  of the Constitution  Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act  1982,  ch.  11  (U.K.).
124.  See, e.g., Mitchell v.  M.N.R. [Minister of Nat'l Revenue],  [2001]  1 S.C.R.  911,  928-
29  (Can.).  Relying  on R.  v.  Van der Peet, [1996]  2  S.C.R. 507  (Can.),  Mitchell explained
that
an aboriginal claimant must prove  a modem practice, tradition or custom that has a
reasonable  degree  of continuity  with  the  practices,  traditions  or  customs  that
existed prior to contact ....
Once an aboriginal  right is  established, the issue  is whether the  act which  gave
rise  to  the  case  at  bar  is  an  expression  of that  right.  Aboriginal  rights  are  not
frozen  in  their pre-contact  form:  ancestral  rights  may  find modem  expression.
The  question  is  whether  the  impugned  act  represents  the  modem exercise  of an
ancestral practice, custom or tradition.
Mitchell, [2001]  1 S.C.R. at 928-29; see also id.  at 964  (Binnie, J.,  concurring) (emphasizing
rejection  of the "frozen  rights"  approach  to  defining  the  scope  of art.  35);  Van  der Peet,
[1996]  2  S.C.R. at  514-15  (L'Heureux-Dub&,  J.,  dissenting)  (arguing for  a "dynamic  right"
rather  than a "frozen  right"  approach  to art. 35,  because the  latter imposes  an inappropriate
burden  not  only  to  show  that  the  right  predated  British  settlement  but  that  it  has  been
continuously exercised  since).
125.  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,  [2004] 3  S.C.R. 698 (Can.).
126.  Id.  at  710.  In so doing,  the Court added, "our Constitution succeeds in its ambitious
enterprise, that of structuring the exercise of power by the organs  of the state in times vastly
different from those  in which it was crafted."  Id. at 711.
127.  The Court wrote,
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Court  upheld  section  1  of  the  proposed  federal  marriage  act,  which
extended  the  capacity  to marry  to persons  of the  same  sex. 128  The Court
likewise rejected arguments  that the common  law definition of marriage, as
between a  man and  a woman, defined  the "natural  limits"  of the growth  of
the  Canadian  constitutional  tree. 129  But  the  Court  did  not  uphold  the
entirety  of the  proposed  federal  legislation:  It found that section  2,  which
addressed  who  would  be  obligated  to  perform  such  marriages,  was  not
within  exclusive  federal  legislative  competence,  since  the  provinces  have
power  over  the  solemnization  of marriages. 130  The  "living  tree"  did not
trump plain constitutional allocations of power to the provinces.
[I]t  is  argued  [that]  the  institution  of marriage  escapes  legislative  redefinition.
Existing in its present basic form since time  immemorial, it is not a legal construct,
but rather a supra-legal  construct  subject to  legal  incidents.  In the Persons case,
Lord  Sankey  L.C.,  writing  for  the  Privy  Council,  dealt  with  this  very  type  of
argument,  though  in  a  different  context.  In  addressing  whether  the  fact  that
women  never had occupied  public  office  was relevant  to whether  they  could  be
considered  "persons"  for  the  purposes  of being  eligible  for  appointment  to  the
Senate, he said at p.  134:
The fact that no woman had served or has claimed to serve such an office is
not of great weight when it is remembered that custom  would have prevented
the claim being made or the point being contested.
Customs are apt to develop  into traditions  which are stronger than law and
remain unchallenged  long after the reason for them has disappeared.
The appeal  to history therefore in this particular matter is not conclusive.
Lord Sankey  L.C. acknowledged,  at p.  134,  that "several  centuries  ago" it would
have been  understood that "persons"  should refer only to  men.  Several centuries
ago  it  would  have  been  understood  that  marriage  should  be  available  only  to
opposite-sex  couples.  The  recognition  of same-sex  marriage  in several  Canadian
jurisdictions  as well as two European countries  belies the assertion that the same is
true today.
Id.  at  712.  The  Court  took  note  of Lord  Sankey's  further  language  anticipating  growth
within the "natural limits" of the Act, but concluded that it did not deprive Parliament of the
power  to  authorize  same  sex  unions.  And  with  respect  to  the  argument  that  particular
intentions  of the  framers  should  control,  as  they did  in R.  v.  Blais, [2003]  2  S.C.R.  236
(Can.),  discussed  infra  notes  131-33  and  accompanying  text,  the  Court  distinguished
between historically  specific compromises  and  other provisions:  "That  case  considered  the
interpretive question  in relation to  a particular constitutional agreement, as opposed to a head
of power which must continually adapt to cover new realities.  It is  therefore distinguishable
and does not apply here." Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,  [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 713-14.
128.  The proposed federal  law that was the subject of this reference  provided,
1. Marriage,  for civil purposes,  is the  lawful union of two persons to the exclusion
of all others.
2. Nothing in this Act affects the freedom of officials of religious groups  to refuse
to  perform marriages that are not in  accordance with their religious  beliefs.
Id. at 699 (quoting the proposed legislation).  For the legislation that was in fact enacted after
the  Canadian  Supreme  Court's  decision,  see  An  Act  respecting  certain  aspects  of  legal
capacity  for  marriage  for  civil  purposes  (Civil  Marriage  Act),  2005  S.C.,  ch.  33  (Can.)
(providing, inter alia, that "[m]arriage,  for civil purposes,  is the lawful union of two persons
to the exclusion of all others").
129.  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [20041 3 S.C.R. at 712-13  (referring to arguments
based on language in the Persons  case referring to the constitution as a living tree, capable of
growth "within its natural limits").
130.  Id. at  716-17.  The federal government defended  section 2  as merely declaratory  of
the Parliament's understanding  of the interpretive  effect of section  1.  The  Court, however,
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Nor does the "living tree" overcome specific historic compromises.  In R.
v.  Blais, 131  the  Court  rejected  the  argument  by  an  Aboriginal  person  of
M~tis  heritage  that  a provision  in  the Constitution  Act,  1930,  relating  to
Manitoba's  lands  extended  to  him,  concluding  that  the  meaning  of the
clause, itself an exception to a provision establishing provincial authority to
regulate hunting,  was  limited to  a group of Indians that did not include the
M~tis.  While  reiterating  that the  "living  tree"  doctrine  is a "fundamental
tenet"  of constitutional  interpretation,  "the  Court is  not free  to  invent new
obligations  foreign  to  the  original  purpose  of the  provision  at  issue,  but
rather must anchor the analysis in the historical context of the provision."' 32
The  purpose  of  the  exception  was  limited  by  the  different  historical
relationships  Canada  had  to  different  groups  of  aboriginal  peoples,  the
Court  explained. 133  And  the Canadian  Court  has refused  to apply Charter
section  15's  ban  on  discrimination  to  disrupt  the  entitlement  scheme  to
government  support  of  certain,  but  not  all,  minority  religious  schools
provided  for  in  section  93  of the  1867  Act,  because  "[s]ection  93  is  the
product of an historical compromise which was a crucial step along the road
concluded  that  if the  language  were  operative,  it  was  ultra  vires  the  federal  power  over
marriage  because  it  concerned  who  solemnized  marriage,  and  under the  Constitution Act,
1867, "only the provinces may legislate exemptions  to existing solemnization  requirements;"
and  if it  were  not operative,  it  was  "superfluous"  and  in  any  event  not within  exclusive
federal legislative competence. Id. at  716-17.  For an argument that the ultra vires holding is
of  little  substantive  significance,  see  Peter  W.  Hogg,  Developments-Canada:  The
Constitution and Same-Sex Marriage,  4  Int'l  J. Const.  L.  712,  719-20  (2006).  The  law
enacted after this decision addresses  the freedom of officials of religious groups  to refuse to
perform civil marriages,  but  in somewhat different  language than  had been before  the Court
in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage.  See Civil  Marriage  Act, 2005  S.C.,  ch.  33,  § 3 (Can.)
("It  is  recognized  that  officials  of religious  groups  are  free  to  refuse  .... ");  id.  § 3.1
(providing that no one  should be penalized  under any federal  law  for refusing  to perform  a
same-sex marriage based on Charter-protected religiously based objections).
131.  R. v. Blais, [2003]  2 S.C.R. 236, 237 (Can.).
132.  Id. at 255.
133.  In its unanimous judgment  the Court noted that under section  13 of the Constitution
Act,  1930,
Manitoba  would  have  the  authority  to  pass  laws  respecting  game  and  fish  that
would  apply  to  all  hunting  and  fishing  activities  in  the  province,  including  the
activities  of Indians.  The  exception was  that  Indians,  a subset  of the population
with  a  particular  historical  relationship  to  the  Crown,  would  not  thereby  be
deprived of certain  specified hunting and fishing rights.
The  protection  accorded  by  para.  13  was  based  on  the  special  relationship
between  Indians  and  the  Crown.  Underlying  this  was  the  view  that  Indians
required special  protection and assistance.  Rightly or wrongly,  this view did  not
extend  to the  Mrtis.  The  Mrtis  were  considered  more  independent  and  less  in
need  of  Crown  protection  than  their  Indian  neighbours ....  Shared  ancestry
between  the Mrtis  and the colonizing population,  and the Mrtis'  own claims  to a
different political status than the Indians  in their Lists of Rights, contributed  to this
perception.  The  stark  historic  fact  is  that  the  Crown  viewed  its  obligations  to
Indians,  whom  it  considered  its  wards,  as  different  from  its  obligations  to  the
Mrtis,  who  were  its  negotiating  partners  in  the  entry  of  Manitoba  into
Confederation.
Id. at 252-53; see also R. v. Van der Peet, [1996]  2 S.C.R. 507,  538-40 (Can.)  (emphasizing
the importance of historic, pre-occupation  facts in defining  section 35 rights).
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leading to Confederation." 134  Distinguishing those  "powers"  or "rights"  to
be  given  the  broad,  liberal  interpretation  from  those  regarded  as  more
specific,  historical  compromises  that  need  to  be  read  in  accordance  with
those  historic  intentions  is  thus  necessary  in  the Canadian  jurisprudence,
and presents quite difficult line-drawing questions. 135
One  helpful  articulation  of  the  limits  inherent  in  the  "living  tree"
metaphor is found in R. v. Prosper,
136 where the Court rejected an argument
to  extend  Charter  section  10(b)  to  require  the  government  to  provide
publicly funded "duty"  counsel.137  Under prior case  law  of the  Court, the
police had an obligation to inform the defendant of his section  10(b) right to
"retain  and instruct counsel" and to provide detailed information on existing
Legal  Aid  lawyers,  the  financial  requirements  for  legal  aid,  and  the
availability of "duty"  lawyers  for temporary  advice regardless  of ability to
pay.  However,  these  obligations  were  established  only  with  respect  to
existing  legal  services;  in Prosper, no duty  lawyer  service was  at the  time
available.  A  four-justice plurality  rejected the argument  that  section  10(b)
imposed a duty on the government itself to  assure the availability  of such a
service,  in important  part because  "there  is  evidence  which shows that the
framers  of the  Charter consciously chose not to constitutionalize  a right  to
state-funded  counsel  under  s.  10  of the  Charter."'138  Agreeing  with  the
plurality on this issue, a dissenting opinion stated,
134.  Adler  v.  Ontario,  [1996]  3  S.C.R.  609,  640;  see  also  Reference  re  Educ.  Act
(Quebec),  [1993]  2 S.C.R. 511,  529-30.
135.  See supra text accompanying note  134; infra note  141.
136.  [1994]  3 S.C.R. 236 (Can.).
137.  Section  10(b) provides,  "Everyone  has the right on  arrest or detention...  to retain
and  instruct  counsel  without  delay  and  to be  informed of that right."  Canadian Charter  of
Rights and Freedoms,  § 10(b),  Part I of the Constitution  Act,  1982, being Schedule  B to the
Canada  Act  1982,  ch.  11  (U.K.).  In Prosper,  at the time of his arrest for drunk driving,  the
defendant  was  advised of his  Charter right to  have  the  assistance  of an attorney;  when  he
said  he  wanted  an attorney,  he  was  given  a  list  of Legal  Aid  attorneys,  with  their  home
numbers,  and  sent  to  a  cubicle  where  he  made  fifteen  calls  to  twelve  lawyers,  without
success.  (Legal Aid  at the time had a slowdown and most of its lawyers  would not take new
cases  after  normal  business  hours.)  The  defendant  declined  to  call  private  attorneys,
indicating  he  could  not  afford  them,  and  then  agreed  to  take  the  breathalyzer  test.  The
evidence from  that test formed the basis  for his conviction. See Prosper,  [1994]  3 S.C.R.  at
248-49.
138.  Id. at 266  (Lamer,  C.J., joined by  Sopinka,  Cory and  lacobucci,  JJ.).  In  addition,
the Chief Justice  noted,  "The  fact  that such  an obligation  would  almost certainly  interfere
with governments'  allocation of limited resources  by requiring  them to expend public  funds
on  the  provision  of  a  service  is...  a  further  consideration  which  weighs  against  this
interpretation."  Id. at 267.  Instead, building on  prior cases,  Lamer found that  the police had
a duty to and should have "held off'  to allow  the defendant more time to obtain legal advice
before trying to  elicit incriminating  evidence,  even though waiting  more than  two hours  for
the test  would  deprive  the  Crown  of a  statutory  presumption  from  a  positive  breathalyzer
done within a two hour window  to prove the defendant's  impairedness  while driving, see id.
at 269-76; however, according to the opinion,  later breathalyzer tests could still be taken and
used,  albeit  without  benefit  of the  statutory  presumption.  Id.  at  276-77.  Because  the
defendant  had  not effectively  waived  his  right  to  seek counsel,  the  Court suppressed  the
evidence and vacated  the conviction. Id. at 283-85.  Four dissenting justices disagreed  with
the disposition,  while  a  fifth judge  agreed  with  the  disposition  but on  somewhat  different
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Before  us, counsel  for the  appellant  [Prosper]  ...  referred  to  the "living
tree"  theory  and argued  that the  Charter had  grown  to  the point  where
state-funded  duty  counsel  should be  constitutionally  guaranteed.  While
the  "living  tree"  theory  would  perhaps  let  us  by-pass  the  will  of the
legislature, that theory  is usually used to put right an interpretation which
is no longer in accordance  with the current socio-economic  context....  I
doubt  it can  be  used to  interpret  a  constitutional  document,  such as  the
Charter, which  is  still  in  its infancy  at a time  when the  socio-economic
context  has  not evolved.  Besides,  the "living  tree"  theory has  its  limits
and  has never been used to  transform completely a document or add a
provision which  was specifically rejected at the  outset.  It  would  be
strange, and even dangerous, if courts  could so  alter the constitution of a
country." 
139
Thus,  the  opinions  suggest,  the  "living  tree"  concept  in  constitutional
interpretation  was  not  one  intended  to  contradict  the  specific  historical
intentions  of the  Charter  in  a  period  soon  after  its  enactment,140  nor  to
legitimate such judicial "alterations"  of the constitution.14 1
reasoning.  See id. at 297-308  (McLachlin, J.)  (disagreeing  with Lamer on the "holding off'
duty).
139.  Id. at 287 (L'Heureux-Dub,  J.,  dissenting) (emphasis added).  Two other dissenting
judges indicated in separate opinions their general  agreement with Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's
opinion. See id. at 285 (LaForest, J.,  dissenting); id. at 296-97  (Gonthier, J.,  dissenting).  For
the fourth dissent,  see id. at 308 (Major, J., dissenting).
140.  Cf Gosselin v. Att'y Gen.  of Quebec,  [2002]  4 S.C.R. 429, 491-92  (implying  that,
while  section  7  could  not  now  be  interpreted  to  impose  a  positive  duty  on  the  federal
government  to provide  welfare, it might be so  interpreted in the future  under the living tree
approach).
141.  But cf Hogg, supra note  113, at 83-85 (suggesting that a  1985 decision, Reference re
Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), [1985] 2  S.C.R. 486, ignored the
intended  meaning  of the  phrase  "principles  of fundamental  justice"  in  Charter  section  7,
which,  according  to witnesses  before  the Constitutional  Convention,  was  adopted  to  avoid
the substantive  due process case law of the United States by giving constitutional  protection
only  to  procedural  norms);  see also Sujit  Choudhry,  The  Lochner Era and Comparative
Constitutionalism,  2 Int'l  J.  Const. L.  1, 23-24  (2004)  (agreeing that the Canadian  drafters'
stated intent  was that "principles  of fundamental justice"  meant to  exclude  substantive  due
process  and  was  not  followed  by  the  Court,  but  observing  that  the  drafters'  deepest
concerns-with  economic  substantive  due  process-have  been  influential  in  Canadian
constitutional interpretation).  Although  concluding that the drafting history  was admissible
in determining  the meaning of the Charter, the Court in the reference  concerning the British
Columbia Motor Vehicle  Act found that statements indicating that the words were limited to
procedural justice were  of relatively little weight for several reasons.  First, the statements of
witnesses,  even from  the executive  department  which  drafted  the amended  language,  could
not reliably capture the sentiments of the many people involved in ratification of the Charter.
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), [1985]  2 S.C.R. at
504-08.  Second,  to  give  too much  weight to  such  expressed  original  intentions  would  be
inconsistent  with  the  Charter's  capacity,  over  time,  to  be  a  "living  tree":  "the  rights,
freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in effect become frozen in time to the moment
of adoption with little  or no possibility of growth, development and adjustment  to changing
societal needs."  Id. at  509.  Third, and perhaps more  important, the Court concluded that the
surrounding Charter text and context was  consistent with a broader understanding,  in which
fundamental justice referred  to basic tenets  of Canadian law,  without regard to  the division
between the procedural  and the substantive  in the American jurisprudence. Id. at 498.  I do
not mean to  suggest  that the Canadian  Court  is entirely  consistent  in its  application  of the
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The "living tree"  is a metaphor, not an interpretive  theory that provides a
full  account,  for example, of when  some aspect of the  constitution  is or is
not "frozen."  Its Canadian provenance,  moreover,  is  neither  a reason  for
nor against use of this metaphor here in the United States. 1 42  But the cases
illustrate that the "living tree" metaphor is available to describe an approach
to  constitutional  interpretation  that  contemplates  both  constraint  and
growth.  I explore this metaphor further below.
III.  MOVING  THE METAPHOR?
In contrast to  the  American  metaphor  of a "living  constitution,"  or  the
Australian term, "living force,"  the tree metaphor is one that draws attention
to  origins,  to roots,  as  well  as  to  the  possibility  of growth.  It  implies  a
connection  with  interpretation  in  older decisions  and  a  more  constrained
view  of  the  choices  open  to  later  generations-unlike  animals  that  can
migrate  at will, plants (including  trees), must grow from where they begin,
and maintain  contact with their roots for nourishment  and health.  Though
not  without  its  difficulties,  the  living  tree  metaphor  embraces  the  mixed
elements  of rootedness  and  change  that  are  so  much  a part  of American
constitutional adjudication.
That  the  case  which  gave  rise  to  this  expression  in  Canada  concerns
gender equality  is  not surprising.  Constitutions  are framed,  inevitably,  by
human  beings whose commitments  to enduring  principles,  such  as equality
or  liberty,  may  coexist  with  quite  narrow  present  understandings  of the
application  of those principles.  Both  the United  States  and Australia have
had  original  constitutions  that  were  emphatically  not  intended  to  treat
women,  or  racial  minorities,  with  that  equality  which  contemporary
understandings  of constitutionalism require. 143  Not only did the  1789 U.S.
"living  tree" doctrine or of constraints upon it based on the clarity of founding compromises.
(Indeed,  one  wonders  in  Prosper if Chief Justice  Lamer's  interpretation  might  have  the
practical  effect of compelling provinces to provide duty counsel, notwithstanding  the refusal
to so interpret the Charter.)  My  point is only that the "living  tree" implies both growth  and
limits.
142.  While  Canadian commitments  to  constitutionalism,  the  rule of law, and democracy
are  of  long  standing,  there  are  important  differences  between  Canadian  and  U.S.
constitutional  history,  structure,  and  text  that  caution  against  any  ready  assumption  that
constitutional  interpretations  that are  legitimate  in the  one  would  be  so  in the  other.  The
Canadian constitutional  texts  developed  incrementally  over time,  as Canada  moved  from  a
British  colony  to full  independence.  See supra notes  94,  115.  Canada's  Charter of Rights
and  Freedoms,  under which  many of the  "living  tree"  cases have  arisen, was  adopted  long
after the major rights-protecting provisions of the U.S. Constitution  and provides (at least in
theory)  for  democratic  limitation  of  the  effects  of  its  Court's  decisions  through  a
"notwithstanding"  clause  in  effect  permitting  legislative  overrides  of Charter  rights  for
limited  time  periods.  See  Canadian  Charter  of  Rights  and  Freedoms,  §  33  (permitting
national  or  provincial  governments  to  enact  laws  valid  for  up  to  five  years,
"notwithstanding"  certain Charter rights).
143.  Section  41  of the Australian  Constitution was  designed to assure  that those  women
then  allowed to vote  in state  elections  (only two states  at the  time allowed  adult women to
vote)  would  be  able  to  vote  in  Commonwealth  elections,  but  it  was  a  compromise,
transitional provision,  not itself intended to  enfranchise  the many other women  in Australia
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Constitution  contemplate  the  continued  existence  of slavery  and  a voting
structure favoring the slave states, but there is evidence that the framers and
ratifiers  of the  Fourteenth  Amendment  did  not necessarily  understand  the
Equal  Protection  Clause  to  prohibit  state  imposed  segregation  of  the
races. 144  The Fourteenth Amendment  introduced a provision indicating that
male voting rights counted more than female, just as its stirring statement  of
national  citizenship  and  equal  protection  of the  laws  was  invoked  by
women to claiming voting rights. 145  Although the Nineteenth Amendment
extended  suffrage  to  women,  it did  not on  its  face  direct  a  more  general
constitutional  acceptance of the equality of women within the framework  of
the Fourteenth  Amendment.  But  the  Fourteenth Amendment  has been re-
understood to prohibit most gender  classifications, 146 in part  as  a result  of
who could not at the time vote in elections or on referenda on the constitution. See Deborah
Cass  &  Kim  Rubenstein,  Representation/s of Women  in  the  Australian Constitutional
System,  17  Adel. L. Rev.  3, 11,  28-39  (1995);  Goldsworthy,  Originalism, supra note 57,  at
46-47.  Issues of gender equality have generated  apparent departures  from narrow  forms  of
originalist  interpretation.  In  Cheatle v.  The  Queen  (1993)  177  C.L.R.  541  (Austl.),  the
Australian  High Court interpreted  section  80 of the  Constitution,  which requires  a trial  by
jury, to  require  unanimity  in verdicts  of conviction.  In  its  discussion, the  Court  indicated
that the jury trial  right now  required  the  inclusion of women  (and  the  poor) on the juries,
even  though  in  1900  juries  were  made  up  only  of  men  meeting  minimum  property
qualifications.  Id. at  560-61.  Excluding  women  was  no  "essential  feature"  of the  right;
indeed, "[tihe  relevant essential feature..,  was, and is, that the jury be... representative  of
the wider community" and excluding  women  would now  be inconsistent with this essential
feature.  The Court's  opinion recognized that the  exclusion  of women  and persons without
property  was "seen  as justified in  earlier days by a then current perception that the only true
representatives of the wider community were men of property,"  but  stated that it would  be
"absurd  to  suggest  that  a  requirement  that  the  jury  be  truly  representative  requires  a
continuation of any  such exclusion  in  the  more  enlightened  climate  of  1993."  Id.  At the
same time, the Court held, the requirement of unanimity for jury  verdict was  an "essential"
feature of the original jury right that could not be changed. Id. at 561.
144.  See,  e.g.,  Raoul  Berger,  Government  by  Judiciary:  The  Transformation  of the
Fourteenth Amendment  116-54  (2d ed. 1997);  Michael  Klarman,  An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection,  90  Mich. L. Rev.  213, 252  (1991);  see also Alexander M. Bickel,
The Original  Understanding  and the Segregation  Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 58-63 (1955)
(arguing that although there  is  no evidence of any specific  intention to prohibit  segregation
by  enacting  the Fourteenth  Amendment,  the broad  wording  of Section  1 was  designed to
leave  open  for  the  future,  through  "language  capable  of growth,"  the  full  extent  of the
Amendment's  promise  of  the  "equal  protection  of  the  laws").  But  see  Michael  W.
McConnell,  Originalism and the  Desegregation Decisions, 81  Va.  L.  Rev.  947  (1995)
(arguing against the widespread consensus  that Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.  294
(1955),  was inconsistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment).
145.  See U.S.  Const. amend. XIV  §§  1, 2; Reva  Siegel, She The People:  The Ninteenth
Amendment,  Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family,  115  Harv.  L.  Rev.  947,  971-73
(2002).  The Supreme  Court rejected the  claim that women had a right to vote by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment  in Minor v. Happersett,  88 U.S.  162 (1875).
146.  Professor  Siegel  argues that  although  early judicial  decisions  after adoption of the
Nineteenth Amendment correctly.understood  it as a constitutional  "norm,"  with implications
for many  areas of the law, it was  soon thereafter treated as a narrower, "constitutional rule"
relating only to suffrage.  Siegel, supra  note  145,  at  1020-22; see also id. at 1015  (discussing
Adkins  v.  Children's Hospital, 261  U.S.  525  (1923),  and  commenting  that  "[t]he  Adkins
opinion is historically significant, not simply because it reads the Nineteenth  Amendment as
conferring equality on women, but because the opinion understands  sex equality as  freedom
from traditions of reasoning about gender rooted in the common law of marital  status").
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social  and  cultural change in the understandings  of human  equality, of the
manifestation of these changed understandings  in statutory  law, and judicial
development  of equality  norms,  including-the  casting  off of prior doctrine
built  on  assumptions  of women's  incapacities  or  differences.1 47  These
understandings of women's equality-embodied in the movement on behalf
of the  Nineteenth  Amendment-have  been  read  in  to  the  provisions  of
Section  1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the gender-based  distinction
in Section  2  has  been essentially  ignored,  treated  as  the more  historically
specific  (and  anachronistic)  clause  it was and,  to the extent it embodied a
principle of gender discrimination in voting, as overruled by the Nineteenth
Amendment.
148
The "living  tree"  metaphor embraces such a process of re-understanding
the  application  of a  broad  constitutional  concept  like  equality,  over  the
possible  objections  of originalists.149  But  it  also  captures  the  degree  to
147.  See Siegel, supra note  145,  at  1042 ("[W]e should  interpret the Constitution so as to
honor  the  decision  of  the  Nineteenth  Amendment's  framers  to  disavow  traditional
understandings of the family supporting women's disfranchisement; yet we...  ought not...
do  so by  endeavoring  to build the constitutional  order..,  on  the gender  understandings  of
men  who  had  just  concluded  that  gender  restrictions  on  the  franchise  offended  the  first
principles  of our constitutional  democracy.  We honor these foundational  acts of lawmaking
by  reading  them  as  foundations,  whose  significance  to  us  today  is  legible  through  the
subsequent  constitutional  struggle  that  they  inaugurated  .... ");  see  also  id.  at  1033
("Arguably,  the  post-ratification  history  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment-the  history  of
Brown  and  the  civil  rights  movement-now  plays  a  more  important  role  in  shaping
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's  Equal Protection  Clause  than does  anything
in  the  debates  attending  its  adoption.");  Vicki  C.  Jackson,  Holistic  Interpretation,
Comparative Constitutionalism,  and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58  U.  Miami  L.  Rev. 265,  271-83
(2003)  (suggesting  that the  equality  norms  represented  in  the  Fourteenth  and Nineteenth
Amendments  may  affect  understandings  of  earlier  parts  of the  Constitution).  On  the
importance  of transnational  interchange  in effecting  changed  constitutional  understandings,
see  Judith  Resnik,  Law's Migration:  American  Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism's Multiple  Ports of Entry,  115  Yale  L.J.  1564  (2006)  and  Judith  Resnik,
Categorical  Federalism: Jurisdiction,  Gender, and the Globe, 111  Yale L.J. 619 (2001).
148.  See John Hart Ely, Interclausal  Immunity, 87 Va. L. Rev.  1185,  1190 (2001).  But cf
Edward Hartnett, A  "Uniform and Entire  " Constitution; or, What ifMadison Had Won?,  15
Const. Comment.  251,  276-77  (1998)  (speculating  that, had the amendments  been  inserted
into  preexisting  constitutional  text  as  it  was  modified,  the  Fourteenth  Amendment's
provision calling  for reduction  of representation might  have been deleted after  the Fifteenth
Amendment,  but  treating  section  2  of the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  still  operative  in
requiring reduction in representation  for denials of male voting).  The gender equality  cases
cannot  be  read  simply  as  the  product  of changed  circumstances,  as  in the  application  of
constitutional  rules to previously unforeseen technologies,  since the underlying argument  for
women's equality  had been  available  for centuries.  Rather,  they represent  how  the "living
tree"  approach  permits  revised  understandings  to  develop  through  interpretive  processes,
where those  understandings  are in  a sense continuous  with  values that can  be  identified  as
immanent in the Constitution.
149.  Cf  Antonin  Scalia,  A  Matter  of  Interpretation  47  (1997)  (suggesting  that  the
Nineteenth  Amendment  was  necessary  to  give  women  a  constitutional  right  to  vote);
Goldsworthy,  Originalism,  supra note 57,  at 39-40, 46-48  (disapproving  of the willingness
of the  Australian  Court  in  Cheatle and  two  other  cases  to  revise  understandings  of the
original Australian Constitution  to now include women as  members of juries and as  voters,
especially  since the compromise over section 41  of the Constitution, which secured the vote
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which  constitutional  questions,  and  hence  analyses,  are  constrained  and
framed  by  the  text  of a  constitution.  In  U.S.  constitutional  practice,  no
judicial  nominee  would  claim  to  be  unconcerned  with  original
understanding  embodied  in the  Constitution's  text. 15 0  The  disagreements
are about  (a)  whether  those meanings  are understood broadly or narrowly,
as "concepts  or conceptions,"'151 or as "enactment  intentions  or application
intentions," 152 and (b) whether original understandings  are the dominant, or
exclusive,  basis  for  decision,  over  and  above  past  precedents,  reasoning
from broad  structure,  evolving understandings of the meaning  of concepts,
or  consequences  or  different  interpretive  choices  in  light  of underlying
constitutional  values.  Originalism,  while  inadequate  as  a  complete
interpretive  approach  for  a  deeply  entrenched  constitution  designed  to
function  over time,  draws  on normatively  powerful  ideas  of continuity  in
self-governance  and the rule of law that ought not to be  ignored. 153  There
may  be  some  issues  that  are  best  determined  through  a  predominantly
originalist  analysis;  Jed  Rubenfeld  suggests  that  there  are  paradigmatic
wrongs  that  constitutional  provisions  sought  to  prevent  which  cannot  be
ignored in interpretation without depriving the Constitution of its normative
roots. 154  There may be particular provisions  which should be interpreted to
for  women  in  South  Australia,  followed  on  the  defeat  of  an  effort  to  provide  for  full
women's suffrage).
150.  See, e.g., Nomination of  Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice  of the Supreme
Court of  the United States: Hearings  Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.  120
(1994)  (colloquy between  Sen. Orrin  G. Hatch and then-Judge Breyer) (Question  by Senator
Hatch:  "Would you agree, then, that the meaning of the law is to be ascertained  according to
the understanding  of the  law  when  it  was enacted?"  Answer of Stephen  Breyer:  "Almost
always....  The reason that  I hesitate  a little  is because..,  there  are  instances, particularly
with the  Constitution and  other places,  where  it is  so open  and  unclear as  to just how the
Framers  or  authors  intended  it.");  Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to  be  Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearings Before the S. Comm.  on  the
Judiciary, 103d  Cong.  127-28  (1993)  (Colloquy  between  Sen.  Hatch  and  then-Judge
Ginsburg) (asserting in response to  Sen. Hatch  that there will be  questions  whether  specific
intention  concerning  equality  or  general  intention  to  create  an  enduring  Constitution  will
control,  but  generally  agreeing  that judges  should  consider  the  law  givers'  intentions);  cf
Stephen  Breyer, Madison Lecture:  Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U.  L.  Rev. 245,
260  (2002)  (arguing  for  an  approach  that  goes  beyond  text  and  precedent  to  consider
consequences  for active liberty);  Ruth Bader Ginsburg,  Confirming Supreme Court  Justices:
Thoughts on  the Second Opinion Rendered by  the Senate, 1988  U.  I11.  L.  Rev.  101,  105
(1988)  (discussing original understanding  with respect to the confirmation process).
151.  See Dworkin, Taking  Rights  Seriously, supra note 88,  at  134,  136-37 (arguing  that
judges  should  consider  constitutional  terms  like "equality"  not as  specific  conceptions  of
rights  but as  "appeals  to moral  concepts");  see also Chemerinsky, supra note  28,  at 91-94
(discussing  choice  among  various  levels  of specificity  and  generality  in  defining  original
meaning or intent).
152.  Goldsworthy,  Originalism, supra note  57,  at  20  (arguing  that  a  distinction  in
"enactment"  and  "application"  intentions  (which  roughly  corresponds  to  the  distinction
between  broad  concepts  and  specific  conceptions)  is  an aspect of "moderate  originalism");
cf  Scalia, supra note  18,  at 861  (arguing  that virtually every  originalist would  allow for the
operation  of stare  decisis).
153.  I discuss this point in Jackson, supra note 25.
154.  On  paradigmatic  cases,  see  Jed  Rubenfeld,  Freedom  and  Time:  A  Theory  of
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continue unchanged from their inception  because of their textual clarity  or
how  foundational  they  were  to  historically  contingent  agreements  to
federate,  notwithstanding  their possible  inconsistency with other normative
constitutional  values.  In the  United  States  today,  perhaps  the rule of two
senators is one such example.155
The "living tree" metaphor links present day constitutional  decisions with
a  specific national  past,  conveying a more organic  notion of constitutional
interpretation. 156  It  also  captures  the  element  of  contingency  in  organic
constitutional  development  more  powerfully perhaps  than Dworkin's chain
novel  metaphor157-not  simply  the  path  dependency  of decision-making,
but the way  in which real and complex developments  in a world outside of
law, outside of the  imagination  of any  single author in the chain, condition
both  the  questions  and  the  context  for  decision.  It  conveys  the  idea  of
balance (so the tree will not fall over); it avoids the inflexibility of narrowly
grounded  historical  interpretation  (structures  that are too rigid break rather
than bend under the pressures  of time).  It embodies  the idea of flexibility
over time,  of the  shaping  and  pruning  of a tree  through  forces  of human
agency  as well  as conditions  that push in  particular directions,  without the
connotations  of  untethered,  illegitimate  decision-making  by  whoever
time, see Akhil Reed Amar,  The Bill of Rights:  Creation  and Reconstruction 236-37 (1998)
(asserting  that  our  understanding  of the  paradigmatic  expression  protected  by  the  First
Amendment moved from being the work of popular newspapers  to the unpopular abolitionist
speaker and arguing that the shift was  part of a "new  First-Fourteenth  Amendment  tradition
that is less majoritarian  and more libertarian").
155.  Cf Ely, supra note  148, at  186-87,  1199 (suggesting that the two senators rule stands
and is not plausibly open to alternative interpretations).
156.  On  the  centrality  and  importance  of metaphors  in  the  structure  of law  and  legal
argument,  see  Steven  L. Winter, A  Clearing  in the  Forest:  Law, Life  and Mind 21,  43-68
(2001)  (insisting  on  "the  irreducibly  imaginative  nature  of reason"  and  suggesting  that
logical  arguments  or  principles  in  law  are  inextricably  related  to  larger  conceptual
metaphors).  Winter acknowledges  the  legal realist and other  critiques of metaphor,  noting,
for example, Cardozo's  statement that  "[m]etaphors  in law are  to be  narrowly watched,  for
starting  as  devices  to  liberate  thought,  they  end  often by  enslaving  it."  Id. at  2  (quoting
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry Co.,  155 N.E. 58,  61  (N.Y.  1926)).  But, Winter argues, metaphors
are  an  inescapable  part  of human  reasoning--even  the  language  of "breaking"  the  law
involves an implicit metaphor comparing law to a physical object. Id. at 4.
157.  Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 228-32  (1986).  Metaphors  play an important role in
conceptualizing  or expressing  interpretive  theories.  Cf Philip  Bobbitt,  Constitutional  Fate
238  (1982)  (describing  John Wheeler's  twenty  questions game, where  responders  agree  to
have no fixed answer to what "it"  is,  the dialogue is constructed by what the questioner asks,
and  the  answer  to  each  question  is  constrained  to  fit  with  prior  responses);  id. at  248
(describing  the  Constitution  as  like  a  ballet  dancer's  mirrored  wall,  reflecting  unceasing
movement);  Bruce  Ackerman,  Constitutional  Politics/Constitutional  Law, 99 Yale  L.J. 453,
546  (1989)  (analogizing  to train  travel, with judges as interpreters  in  the caboose, watching
the terrain  in which recent constitutional  developments  in the foreground  are integrated  into
a  landscape  including the more  distant past).  On the importance  of accuracy  and intuitive
accessibility  of  metaphors,  see  also  Edward  Rubin,  Independence  as  a  Governance
Mechanism, in Judicial  Independence  at The Crossroads:  An Interdisciplinary Approach 56,
57-63  (Stephen  B.  Burbank  &  Barry  Friedman  eds.,  2002)  (arguing  against  the  three-
branched  tree  as  a  metaphor  for the  modem  state  and  in  favor  of a  network  image  and
discussing  work  by  others  attacking  arborescent  imagery  as  too  "unitary,  logical  and
hierarchical").
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happens to be the judges.  It treats the Constitution as under-determined, but
not entirely  indeterminate;  there are  roots,  a trunk,  and large branches  that
condition  the  choices  open  to  claimants,  litigants,  and judges. 158  And  it
conveys both the possible longevity, and possible  fragility, of a constitution.
On  the  other hand,  the  "living  tree"  is  only  a  metaphor  and,  in  some
respects,  a  misleading  one.  The  image  that  may  come  to  mind-a
spreading  oak,  a  graceful  maple,  the iconic representations  of the  "tree  of
life"-are  single-trunked  and  generally  symmetrically  branched.  Older
constitutions,  like  the  United  States',  however,  may  have  formal
amendments  that are  in some  respects more like second  trunks.  The  Civil
War  Amendments  in  the United  States do  not seem  entirely  like branches
but  rather  like  new  legal  roots  of  a  markedly  changed  form  of
constitutionalism.  Likewise, in Canada, the Charter of 1982  does not seem
so much like a branch as a newly rooted foundation, a joint foundation with
the  1867 Act.  Can we conceive of a multi-trunked tree?  Although there are
such trees (banyan trees  have  multiple trunks  and roots;  aspens  may grow
as clones  in groves with a common root system), the  metaphor now seems
strained. 159  Moreover, the natural  metaphor understates  the  role of human
agency  and  the  extent  of the  rupture  in  the  United  States  from  founding
premises represented  by the Civil War Amendments'  outlawing of slavery,
abandonment  of the  "three-fifths  compromise,"  and  extension  of  federal
constitutional rights to limit the state governments.
Thus,  while  for  some  the  living  tree  is  not  a  rigid  enough  image  to
capture  the role of a constitution  in  "obstructing  modernity,"  60 for others
the  metaphor  may  imply  too  much  continuity,  too  much  balance  and
harmony  over  time,  too  little  recognition  of  the  significance  of formal
constitutional  change  when it happens, as was the case in several  decisions
in  the  post-Civil  War  era.161  And  the  "naturalness"  of  the  living  tree
metaphor  is misleading  with  respect  to the many  forms of human  agency
that influence the development of constitutional  law.  A tree's branches  will
158.  Cf Goldsworthy, Originalism,  supra note 57,  at 29 (arguing,  from the perspective of
a "moderate  originalist,"  that judges need not choose between "living  tree"  and "dead  hand
of the past,"  because  the living tree metaphor embraces the idea  that "the  very possibility  of
growth depends on the trunk and  roots remaining firmly in place").
159.  Cf Rubin, supra note  157, at 60-61 (criticizing the use of a "rhizome"  analogy (as in
a strawberry bush) for representing modem bureaucracy,  on the grounds that it is  inaccurate
in  its  failure  to  capture  hierarchy  in  bureaucracy  and  non-intuitive,  thus  defeating  the
purpose of using a metaphor).
160.  See Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution,  supra note 84,  at 313.
161.  See, e.g.,  Plessy  v.  Ferguson,  163  U.S. 537  (1896)  (upholding  state  imposed  racial
segregation  in public  transport); The Civil  Rights  Cases,  109  U.S.  3 (1883)  (holding public
accommodations  provisions  of federal  civil  rights  law  unconstitutional);  United  States  v.
Harris,  106  U.S.  629  (1883)  (narrowly  construing  congressional  authority  to provide  for
prosecution  and punishment  of  members  of a lynch  mob).  Indeed, viewing  the Civil War
Amendments  as  mere  'branches'  of a  constitution  rooted  in  the  older  structure  of  1789,
rather  than  as  cutting  away  or  uprooting  a  significant  part of that  structure,  might  have
contributed to the narrow judicial constructions  of those Amendments that helped undermine
Reconstruction  era efforts towards racial justice and equality.
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grow  in  directions  influenced  by  the  availability  of  sun  and  water,
responsive  to a natural  environment,  but the environment of a constitution
is  made  up  of  human  beings,  acting  individually,  in  groups,  and  in
institutions.  There  is  a  choicefulness  in  constitutional  development  that
natural, organic metaphors obscure.
But as metaphors  go, there may still be  something to say for moving our
metaphor  away  from  the  less  tethered  "living  constitution"  towards  the
more  rooted  "living  tree."  It  better  captures  the  degree  to  which
constitutional  interpretation  is  framed,  though  not  necessarily  determined,
by  the  Constitution's  text  and the  Court's past  decisions  and  at  the  same
time  captures  the  necessarily  evolutive  nature  of  constitutional
interpretation  over time.  In  a period  when  a leading  judge  in  the  lower
federal  courts  accuses  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  of
"lawless[ness]"  in  making  "naked  political"  choices  in  constitutional
interpretation  in  the  Foreword of the  Harvard Law Review, 162  one  may
question the  efficacy  of words and  metaphors to  diminish  the polarization
that over the  long  run  will threaten  the  capacities  of courts  to function  as
independent  checks  on  the  other  branches  of  government.  But  if
constitutional  law is  to remain  law, enforceable  by  independent courts  as a
constraint,  the  search  for  some  middle  ground  of interpretive  agreement
may prove to be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition. 163
162.  Posner, supra note 2, at 41,  75,  78,  90.
163.  Cf McConnell, supra note 83,  at 2390 (praising Justice Breyer's book for reminding
readers  that "[l]aw  is not simply politics in another guise" and that, despite their differences,
most  judges  use  similar  legal  tools  for  constitutional  interpretation).  Judge  McConnell
writes,  "Our differences  are certainly  important,  as  this book  demonstrates,  but differences
should  not be  confused  with chasms.  If Justice  Breyer's elegant and  accessible  little book
helps to calm the waters, it will have done a national service." Id.
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